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N I C K  W E R L E  
Prosecuting Corporate Crime when Firms Are Too Big 
to Jail: Investigation, Deterrence, and Judicial Review 
abstract.  Some corporations have become so large or so systemically important that when 
they violate the law, the government cannot credibly threaten “efficient” criminal sanctions. By 
introducing political-economy constraints into a standard microeconomic model of corporate lia-
bility, this Note shows how this Too-Big-to-Jail (TBTJ) problem reduces prosecutors’ ability to 
deter corporate crime by simply ﬁning a defendant corporation without the accompanying pros-
ecution of culpable individuals and mandatory structural reforms. Prosecutors often lack the abil-
ity to charge culpable individuals or enforce structural reforms. This Note further illustrates how 
the risk of corporate criminal liability alone cannot incentivize a TBTJ ﬁrm to invest in internal 
controls or cooperate with government investigations. To deter criminality by TBTJ ﬁrms, pros-
ecutorial strategy should credibly threaten culpable managers with monetary and nonmonetary 
penalties and not unduly rely on corporate defendants’ cooperation. 
 The Note also advances a structural explanation for the dearth of individual prosecutions rel-
ative to negotiated criminal settlements with TBTJ companies: prosecutors currently rely on an 
apparatus for investigation that may produce information necessary for corporate settlements but 
will not reliably produce evidence necessary to charge culpable individuals. In response, this Note 
proposes enlisting the courts as a bulwark against these structural incentives for prosecutors to 
agree to large corporate settlements without insisting on comprehensive investigation of underly-
ing individual culpability. Thus, I propose a legislative reform that would authorize judicial review 
of deferred prosecution agreements to ensure prosecutors have collected sufficient evidence prior 
to ﬁnalizing corporate settlements. 
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introduction 
Since 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has prosecuted numerous 
companies for a range of crimes, including fraud, bribery, environmental crime, 
occupational safety violations, antitrust, and money laundering.
1
 But relatively 
few of these cases have resulted in charges against culpable individuals. From 
2001 to 2014, individuals faced prosecution in only 34% of the 306 cases in which 
federal prosecutors reached negotiated criminal settlements with corporate 
wrongdoers, with only 414 total individuals prosecuted.
2
 Although the pace of 
corporate criminal settlements has increased since 2001, the proportion featuring 
individual prosecutions and the total number of individuals given custodial sen-
tences have barely changed.
3
 
Even when individuals are prosecuted, they are generally sentenced more le-
niently than defendants who faced similar charges outside of the corporate-
crime context. Namely, defendants in corporate-crime cases who plead guilty or 
are convicted receive jail sentences less frequently and serve less jail time than do 
defendants facing similar charges for noncorporate crime.
4
 The divergence be-
tween ﬁrm-level prosecutions and the dearth of individual prosecutions has fo-
mented a popular narrative that the government permits managers to buy their 
way out of trouble, using shareholder assets to avoid individual criminal penal-
ties by agreeing to criminal settlements.
5
 
Despite this, the law-and-economics literature has suggested that govern-
ment can, in some circumstances, deter corporate crime using entity liability 
alone.
6
 Both theoretical and empirical studies treat corporate-crime control as an 
 
1. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPO-
RATIONS 5 (2014). 
2. Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1802 (2015). 
3. See id. at 1804 tbl.1. 
4. Id. at 1810-12 (analyzing data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission). This statistic includes 
all convicted defendants, including those sentenced to probation but no jail time. However, 
defendants in corporate-crime cases who did receive jail time had a higher average sentence 
than people incarcerated for other crimes in similar categories. Id. 
5. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prose-
cuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan
/09/ﬁnancial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/4GPY-JX24]; Office 
of Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Rigged Justice: How Weak Enforcement Lets Corporate Offenders Off 
Easy, U.S. SENATE 1 (Jan. 2016), http://www.warren.senate.gov/ﬁles/documents/Rigged
_Justice_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HSY-WBFD]. 
6. See infra Section II.B; see, e.g., Wallace P. Mullin & Christopher M. Snyder, Should Firms Be 
Allowed to Indemnify Their Employees for Sanctions?, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 30, 32 (2010) (“We 
prosecuting corporate crime when firms are too big to jail 
1369 
agency cost, since intraﬁrm information asymmetries stymie the monitoring of 
employees, who may engage in criminal conduct for private gain. Models of cor-
porate crime treat this intraﬁrm agency problem as nested inside another agency 
relationship, with government seeking to deter corporate crime through a mix 
of incentives for corporate cooperation and punishment for wrongdoing. These 
standard models treat prosecutors’ decisions to apportion criminal liability be-
tween companies and culpable individuals as merely discretionary choices be-
tween strategic substitutes.
7
 The “optimal” punishment in the aggregate is one 
that forces companies and their managers to internalize the social costs of their 
criminal conduct. According to this theory, the government can optimize deter-
rence via a range of different strategies, such as (1) only prosecuting and ﬁning 
corporations, (2) only prosecuting culpable individuals, or (3) adopting a mixed 
strategy in which prosecutors bring charges against corporations and employees. 
Taking DOJ policies on their face, the government has tried to prosecute both 
companies and individuals. DOJ employs a regime of aggressive ﬁnes, with dis-
counts for corporate cooperation and self-reporting that purport to induce com-
panies to invest in elaborate compliance and internal-investigation systems and 
to proactively disclose employee wrongdoing. According to economic theory, 
these threats all operate ex ante, with the risk of punishment and rewards of 
lawful cooperation shaping corporate practices and managerial behavior. 
But does this strategy work? Does imposing large ﬁnes on corporations ac-
tually deter corporate crime?
8
 Recent history suggests not. In his comprehensive 
2014 study of corporate criminal prosecution, Brandon Garrett found that cor-
porate recidivism rates remain disturbingly high.
9
 He identiﬁes as particularly 
troubling cases in which prosecutors ﬁnd a company violating the law while sub-
ject to an active deferred prosecution agreement (DPA)—a contract that osten-
sibly prohibits future criminal conduct and requires ongoing cooperation with 
prosecutors.
10
 These repeat offenses should result in sentencing enhancements 
 
show that deterrence can typically be obtained at minimum social cost by sanctioning the ﬁrm 
alone.”). 
7. Cindy R. Alexander, Corporate Crime, Markets and Enforcement: A Review, in NEW PERSPEC-
TIVES ON ECONOMIC CRIME 20, 23 (Hans Sjögren & Göran Skogh eds., 2004). 
8. This Note refers to “corporations” and uses the term interchangeably with “ﬁrms” and “com-
panies.” But like the Justice Manual’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, 
the Note’s analysis “appl[ies] to the consideration of the prosecution of all types of business 
organizations.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.200 n.1, https://www.justice
.gov/usam [https://perma.cc/Z4R5-JCWR] [hereinafter JUSTICE MANUAL]. 
9. See generally GARRETT, supra note 1, at 165-68. 
10. This discussion deliberately excludes nonprosecution agreements (NPAs), in which DOJ 
agrees not to bring any charges at all in exchange for a large payment from the corporate 
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when the new criminal charges are resolved, and they should prompt prosecu-
tors to trigger breach proceedings under any existing DPAs. But this rarely hap-
pens; Garrett concludes that “[i]t is not at all clear that prosecutors take corpo-
rate recidivism seriously.”
11
 Indeed, the list of recidivists with multiple corporate 
convictions in quick succession includes industry giants such as BP, ExxonMobil, 




The Too-Big-to-Jail (TBTJ) problem therefore signiﬁes the “concern that 
some companies may be so valuable to the economy that prosecutors will not 
hold them accountable for crimes.”
13
 When defendant companies are so large, 
so systemically important, and so politically powerful that prosecutors cannot 
credibly threaten them with a “socially optimal” penalty, does deterrence still 
work? This Note contends that when ﬁrms become TBTJ, deterrence breaks 
down. When prosecutors set law enforcement strategy to deter crime by power-
ful ﬁrms, the standard economic incentives fail to adequately disincentivize 
criminal activity. Given this, prosecutors should modify their strategic objectives 
and investigative tactics to effectively manage the problem of corporate crime. 
The Note presents a microeconomic model of corporate criminal prosecution 
in the context of TBTJ business organizations. It shows that when a defendant 
ﬁrm is TBTJ, prosecutors may be unable to induce it to cooperate with the gov-
ernment in good faith. The model also shows that there are conditions under 
which managers of TBTJ ﬁrms evaluating whether to engage in unlawful con-
duct may ﬁnd criminality proﬁtable for themselves and their ﬁrms. In this con-
text, prosecutors should account for these unique political-economy constraints 
by encouraging third-party monitoring, rather than relying exclusively on inter-
nal corporate investigation. They should also further prioritize resolutions that 
mandate structural reform on companies and impose nonmonetary sanctions on 
culpable individuals, rather than on corporations alone. 
The following hypothetical illustrates the basic TBTJ dynamic. Consider the 
decision-making process of managers in a global but thinly capitalized bank 
evaluating a highly proﬁtable but illegal opportunity. These managers have the 
option to offer to an important client population a product such as an opaque 
cross-border transaction that facilitates income-tax evasion and laundering of 
drug-trafficking proceeds. Imagine further that during a recent liquidity crunch, 
this bank had received a government bailout because policymakers feared that—
 
defendant, because I propose prohibiting DOJ from entering into this kind of corporate NPA 
altogether. See infra Section VI.B.2. 
11. GARRETT, supra note 1, at 166. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 252. 
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due to its size and interconnectedness—the bank’s default would trigger ﬁnan-
cial contagion and destabilize the national banking system. By providing a 
bailout, the government impliedly announced that the bank was Too Big to Fail 
(TBTF). Suppose the bank managers assume that if they engage in illegal con-
duct, they will earn $500 million in proﬁts, and there is only a 10% chance the 
government detects the transaction and prosecutes the bank. Crudely, one can 
say that, if convicted, the optimal ﬁne would be $5 billion because that would 
make the transaction unproﬁtable from a cost-beneﬁt perspective.
14
 But the 
managers may also know that government regulators believe that a ﬁne of $2 
billion or more will catastrophically weaken the bank’s balance sheet and imperil 
the broader ﬁnancial system. In this situation, the managers may credibly con-
clude that the government will not intentionally damage the bank and trigger a 
ﬁnancial crisis requiring another government bailout. That is, the managers may 
infer that the government is unlikely to impose a ﬁne of more than $2 billion, 
regardless of the corporation’s crimes. 
From a coldly “rational” perspective, the managers would determine that un-
dertaking the illegal transactions would yield a marginal proﬁt of $500 million 
and incur a risk-adjusted prosecutorial ﬁne of $200 million.
15
 In this circum-
stance, if a corporate ﬁne is all the bank managers really have to fear, then even 
from the bank’s perspective this transaction with an expected proﬁt of $300 mil-
lion would be rational. And if the bank’s compensation structure means the man-
agers will get bonuses for generating the extra proﬁt, all the more reason to break 
the law. Of course, this calculus only holds if the managers have no personal fear 
of imprisonment. Given this, prosecutors investigating this bank should not ex-
pect corporate ﬁnes alone to deter this kind of crime. 
This Note’s novel microeconomic model integrates the TBTJ problem into 
the economic analysis of corporate crime and suggests how prosecutorial strat-
egy ought to change in response to this powerful, often binding, constraint on 
the government’s ability to sanction a guilty company. While several similar and 
well-established microeconomic models of corporate criminal liability argue that 
it is possible to optimally deter corporate crime by sanctioning companies in 
some circumstances,
16
 none address the political economy of the TBTJ problem. 
This Note’s model suggests that the government should make three strategic 
shifts when prosecuting crime within a TBTJ ﬁrm. First, where the govern-
ment’s objective is to optimally deter corporate crime, prosecutors must aggres-
 
14. A $5 billion ﬁne would lead to an expected loss of $500 million from prosecution, so expected 
net proﬁts would be zero. 
15. ($2 billion ﬁne) × (10% chance of prosecution) = $200 million expected loss. 
16. See infra Section II.B. 
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sively charge culpable individuals within TBTJ ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, the prosecu-
tion must induce a credible threat of nonmonetary sanctions, such as incarcera-
tion or restraints on future conduct, when individual managers and employees 
break the law. This conclusion reinforces DOJ’s duty to follow its policy, an-
nounced in Sally Yates’s September 2015 Memorandum on Individual Account-
ability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Yates Memo), which endorses individual 
prosecution to combat and deter corporate crime.
17
 
Second, prosecutors negotiating with TBTJ corporate defendants should in-
sist that any settlement mandate structural reforms. Since the TBTJ constraint 
means that criminal conduct may be a proﬁtable choice for some companies, 
ﬁnes alone may be insufficient to induce ﬁrms to rehabilitate. But structural-re-
form prosecutions, formalized through DPAs, permit prosecutors to leverage 
criminal charges to require defendant organizations to make comprehensive in-
stitutional reforms—such as adopting internal controls, divesting problematic 
businesses, and redesigning products.
18
 While courts will not traditionally en-
join crimes, defendant ﬁrms may agree to undertake reforms as part of the give-
and-take of a settlement.
19
 These requirements replace amorphous ﬁnancial in-
centives with contractual obligations that the company must fulﬁll to get out 
from under the DPA’s pending charges. In some DPAs, DOJ has required de-
fendant companies to hire an independent compliance monitor to oversee these 
reforms and ensure that ongoing cooperation is in good faith. But a recent DOJ 
policy statement will lead the Department to reduce its use of monitorships by 
requiring that prosecutors engage in a cost-beneﬁt analysis to avoid creating 
“unnecessary burdens to a business’s operations.”
20
 In contrast, this Note argues 
that monitors are valuable tools and that a defendant company’s TBTJ status 
should weigh in favor of imposing an independent monitor. 
Third, this model ﬁnds that TBTJ companies under investigation for serious 
crimes may have strong disincentives to cooperate with the government in good 
faith. The model demonstrates that constraints on the prosecutor’s ability to 
sanction corporate defendants make a TBTJ ﬁrm’s good-faith cooperation with 
a government’s investigation of individual wrongdoing irrational. This conclu-
sion has substantive implications for prosecutorial strategy, since prosecutors 
 
17. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust 
Div., et al. 1 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/ﬁle/769036/download 
[https://perma.cc/S749-N82D] [hereinafter Yates Memo]. 
18. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 853-54 (2007). 
19. See id. at 874; see also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 593 (1895). 
20. Memorandum from Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., to All Criminal Division Per-
sonnel 2 (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/ﬁle/1100366/download 
[https://perma.cc/L8G2-GNAW]. 
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rely heavily on corporate cooperation against employees pursuant to a DPA or as 
a condition of a plea deal. Indeed, full corporate cooperation against culpable 
individuals is a condition for any leniency under the Yates Memo.
21
 However, 
the model shows that a defendant-funded, internal investigation is no substitute 
for an independent and well-resourced government investigation when ﬁrms are 
TBTJ. 
Given this Note’s ﬁnding that individual prosecutions are necessary to deter 
corporate crime, one might ask why there have been relatively few individual 
prosecutions in contrast to corporate settlements. This Note evaluates several 
possible explanations and concludes that the institutional apparatus used to 
gather evidence for corporate criminal prosecutions may exacerbate this imbal-
ance. The current lack of binding procedure leaves the prosecutorial process vul-
nerable to settlements permitting a dynamic of tacit collusion. Since most “suc-
cessful” cases against TBTJ companies conclude in DPAs and those settlements 
receive no meaningful judicial scrutiny, prosecutors can reap the political bene-
ﬁts of corporate prosecution without pushing an investigation to the point at 
which it develops evidence that inculpates individual managers. To address this 
structural weakness, the Note proposes legislation that would reform DPA prac-
tice. By expressly authorizing substantive judicial review of DPAs and prohibit-
ing other negotiated settlements that bypass court approval, the DPA Procedures 
Act would strengthen the accountability and effectiveness of DOJ’s management 
of corporate crime. 
The Note begins in Part I by analyzing the political economy of the TBTJ 
problem. Part II describes the legal and economic framework within which pros-
ecutors set corporate criminal enforcement strategy. Part III then presents the 
formal microeconomic model. This model plays a central role in the Note’s anal-
ysis of corporate criminal prosecution, but algebra-averse readers may ignore the 
microeconomic details and still follow the legal and policy arguments. The Note 
then returns to law and policy, drawing conclusions from the economic model. 
Part IV shows how, when a ﬁrm becomes TBTJ, it may lack the incentive to co-
operate with prosecutors in good faith. Part V then draws lessons for prosecuto-
rial strategy. It argues that effective deterrence of corporate crime by TBTJ ﬁrms 
requires culpable managers to perceive a credible threat of prosecution for un-
lawful conduct. The Part further argues that prosecutors should rely less on the 
results of internal investigations conducted by TBTJ defendants and should in-
sist that settlements include enforceable mandates for structural reform. Part VI 
proposes a package of legislative reforms to improve prosecutorial strategy in 
cases involving TBTJ defendants. Section VI.A provides a structural explanation 
for the relative rarity of individual prosecutions in connection with settlements 
 
21. See infra Part V. 
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by TBTJ ﬁrms. Section VI.B then proposes legislative and administrative re-
forms to enhance corporate criminal prosecutions, drawing on the economic in-
centives illuminated by the model.
22
 
i .  the too-big-to-jail  problem 
The most familiar type of TBTJ company is a ﬁnancial institution that has 
proven to be TBTF by virtue of having received a past government bailout or 
having been designated as a systemically important ﬁnancial institution. When 
a ﬁrm knows that the government considers it TBTJ, prosecutors are constrained 
in their ability to deter criminal conduct. 
The government acknowledges that a defendant company is TBTJ when the 
ﬁrm’s potential failure or incapacitation is so politically untenable that prosecu-
tors must reduce the severity of sanctions for criminal activity. Once regulators 
have hinted that they will backstop a bank’s ﬁscal health, prosecutors cannot 
credibly threaten sanctions so severe that they would leave it with insufficient 
capital or imperil necessary licenses. Indeed, since the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, 
bailed-out Wall Street institutions have routinely settled serious criminal 
charges on terms that protect their proﬁtability, and their executives continue to 
escape responsibility for allegedly fraudulent conduct.
23
 
Public criticism of this pattern came to a head in March 2013, when the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee conducted hearings on DOJ’s recent DPA with the 
global bank HSBC for facilitating money laundering by Mexican drug cartels 
and similar organizations. Despite the lurid details, the bank was ﬁned $1.92 bil-
lion and no individuals were prosecuted.
24
 Asked whether some companies are 
 
22. The text of the proposed statute, the DPA Procedures Act, appears in Appendix B. 
23. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top
-banker-jail-ﬁnancial-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/X7UU-SR26]; Rakoff, supra note 5; 
Matt Taibbi, Gangster Bankers: Too Big to Jail, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www 
.rollingstone.com/politics/news/gangster-bankers-too-big-to-jail-20130214 [https://perma
.cc/8ZPD-K27P]; Jason M. Breslow, Ted Kaufman: Wall Street Prosecutions Never Made a Pri-
ority, PBS: FRONTLINE (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/ted 
-kaufman-wall-street-prosecutions-never-made-a-priority [https://perma.cc/5HXY 
-WHZD]; Bartlett Collins Naylor, Too Big: The Mega-Banks Are Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Jail, 
and Too Big to Manage, PUB. CITIZEN (2016), http://www.citizen.org/documents/TooBig.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PNL5-73B8]. 
24. See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges of Money 
Laundering, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:10 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2012/12/10/hsbc-said-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over-money-laundering [https://
perma.cc/J8CN-PVAC]; see also Dominic Rushe & Jill Treanor, HSBC’s Record $1.9bn Fine 
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TBTJ, Attorney General Eric Holder acknowledged that the threat of economic 
distress constrains DOJ prosecutors investigating global banks’ crimes: 
I am concerned that the size of some of these institutions becomes so 
large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are 
hit with indications that if we do prosecute—if we do bring a criminal 
charge—it will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps 
even the world economy. I think that is a function of the fact that some 
of these institutions have become too large . . . . I think it has an inhibit-
ing inﬂuence, impact on our ability to bring resolutions that I think 
would be more appropriate.
25
 
Holder’s comments echoed those made by Lanny Breuer, head of DOJ’s Crimi-
nal Division in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis, who conﬁrmed that prosecutors 
regularly consult regulators regarding the systemic implications of their cases 
and change their strategies when “as a result of bringing [a] case there’s some 
huge economic effect.”
26
 Corporate criminal penalties may be large in absolute 
terms, but Garrett’s analysis of settlement data shows that companies almost al-
ways receive ﬁnes at or below the range suggested by the federal Sentencing 
Commission’s Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.
27
 
In many cases, companies mobilize economic and political power to enlist 
foreign government entities in pushing the TBTJ argument. For instance, in the 
HSBC case, the UK Financial Services Authority and UK Chancellor George Os-
borne intervened to help the UK-regulated bank avoid criminal charges.
28
 Sim-
ilarly, during negotiations between DOJ and French bank BNP Paribas, which 
 
Preferable to Prosecution, U.S. Authorities Insist, GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2012, 3:37 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/business/2012/dec/11/hsbc-ﬁne-prosecution-money-laundering 
[https://perma.cc/TM2T-M523] (referencing DOJ officials who argued that the ﬁne and DPA 
were preferable to the “collateral consequences” of taking the bank to court on money laun-
dering charges or revoking its U.S. banking license). 
25. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.judiciary
.senate.gov/meetings/oversight-of-the-us-department-of-justice-2013-03-06 [https://
perma.cc/JK8C-JYWC] (statement of Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
26. Jason M. Breslow, Lanny Breuer: Financial Fraud Has Not Gone Unpunished, PBS: FRONTLINE 
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lanny-breuer-ﬁnancial-fraud 
-has-not-gone-unpunished [https://perma.cc/P4WX-8KN3]. 
27. GARRETT, supra note 1, at 150 (noting that, in an analysis of 255 settlements between 2011 
and 2012, “[a]lmost without exception, [prosecutors] explained that the ﬁne was at or below 
the very bottom of the guidelines range, even for cases involving large public companies. Only 
three agreements noted ﬁnes at the top of the range”). 
28. See Ben McLannahan, Osborne Intervened in U.S. HSBC Money-Laundering Probe, Report Says, 
FIN. TIMES (July 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/2be49f84-47c9-11e6-b387-64ab0a
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had helped clients evade U.S. sanctions, both BNP’s CEO and the Governor of 
the Bank of France met with American authorities to ask for leniency. They ar-
gued that the guilty plea and ﬁne proposed by prosecutors would dangerously 
erode BNP’s capital levels.
29
 French authorities, from the Finance Minister to the 
President, made on-the-record warnings that such a hit to BNP’s balance sheet 
could substantially restrict credit in the struggling national economy, possibly 
requiring a bailout.
30
 French officials also reportedly argued that any limitation 
on the bank’s ability to make U.S.-dollar transactions—the very business at issue 
in the sanctions violations—“could spark a systemic crisis, endangering the 
wider ﬁnancial system.”
31
 BNP Paribas ultimately pled guilty and paid $8.9 bil-
lion, but no individuals were prosecuted.
32
 Although that ﬁne was the highest 
ever for a sanctions case, an analysis by the Wall Street Journal showed that ne-
gotiations may have resulted in a substantial discount: Scottish bank RBS paid 
over ten times more in ﬁnes per dollar of allegedly illegal transactions than did 
BNP.
33




The TBTJ classiﬁcation does not include a ﬁxed membership nor is inclusion 
the result of objective economic analysis. Designating a ﬁrm as TBTJ is a political 
choice that operates before, during, and after each major corporate prosecution, 
 
67014c [https://perma.cc/WW7M-CXAQ]; see also Republican Staff, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Financial Services, Too Big to Jail: Inside the Obama Justice Depart-
ment’s Decision Not to Hold Wall Street Accountable, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES 43 (July 11, 
2016), https://ﬁnancialservices.house.gov/uploadedﬁles/07072016_oi_tbtj_sr.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KSJ4-U857]. 
29. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, BNP Paribas Pinned Hopes on Legal Memo, in Vain, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 3, 2014, 9:11 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/03
/bnp-paribas-pinned-hopes-on-legal-memo-in-vain [https://perma.cc/9FH6-665T]. 




32. See Devlin Barrett et al., BNP Paribas Draws Record Fine for “Tour de Fraud,” WALL ST. J. (June 
30, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bnp-agrees-to-pay-over-8-8-billion-to-settle 
-sanctions-probe-1404160117 [https://perma.cc/M6HF-PJZC] (“Justice Department officials 
said the bank’s unwillingness to come clean earlier made it difficult to charge any individu-
als.”). 
33. See id. (calculating that RBS paid $3.13 for every $1 of alleged violations, Standard Chartered 
paid $1, Credit Suisse paid $0.45, and BNP Paribas paid $0.27-0.30). 
34. Horobin, supra note 30 (“Investors agreed the damage limitation mission was successful: BNP 
Paribas shares jumped over 3% in Tuesday morning trading [just after the ﬁne was an-
nounced].”). 
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not an objective conclusion from a set of static criteria. In other contexts, com-
panies object to inclusion on lists of TBTF institutions because the designation 
can increase costs and regulatory scrutiny.
35
 But in closed-door negotiations with 
prosecutors considering criminal charges or a punitive settlement, powerful 
companies often argue, directly or through proxies, that harsh punishment 
would cause economic devastation.
36
 Although the decision to cap a ﬁrm’s pun-
ishment is hashed out on a case-by-case basis, many defendants are recidivists, 
and virtually all regularly engage with other governmental actors, either as gov-
ernment contractors or as objects of regulatory supervision. Such repeat players 
can reliably predict ex ante whether they are regarded as TBTF, and will there-
fore evade otherwise-appropriate penalties for criminal behavior. Thus, desig-
nation as a TBTJ ﬁrm is not a juridical or administrative categorization but a 
measure of political-economic power. 
No case has inﬂuenced DOJ’s corporate-crime strategy more than its pros-
ecution of “Big Five” accounting ﬁrm Arthur Andersen LLP for its role in the 
Enron debacle.
37
 Following conviction at trial in June 2002, the SEC prohibited 
Andersen from auditing public companies—previously the core of its business. 
The ﬁrm collapsed two months later, throwing thousands of workers out of their 
jobs and further consolidating the systemically important industry of auditing 
public companies.
38
 Worst of all, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the 
entity’s conviction in 2005 due to faulty jury instructions.
39
 But this appellate 
victory neither restored lost jobs nor reversed the accounting industry’s further 
consolidation. 
Following the Andersen episode, DOJ changed policy to consider a corporate 
conviction’s collateral consequences in its charging strategy.
40
 The result was a 
 
35. See, e.g., Metlife v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016). 
36. See, e.g., U.S. Fine on Deutsche Bank Too Big, Damaging to Stability: Dijsselbloem, REUTERS (Oct. 
7, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-deutsche-bank-dijsselbloem 
-idUSKCN1271OE [https://perma.cc/6LUA-CQ47] (describing how the President of the 
Board of Governors of the European Stability Mechanism warned DOJ that a $14 billion ﬁne 
for Deutsch Bank’s fraudulent marketing of faulty mortgage bonds before the ﬁnancial crisis 
would destabilize the European ﬁnancial system). 
37. See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 12 (describing the Arthur Andersen prosecution as “[t]he cor-
porate trial of the century”); Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate 
Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
797 (2013). 
38. GARRETT, supra note 1, at 40-41. 
39. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
40. See Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads 
of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp
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decision-making framework that encouraged prosecutors to negotiate DPAs and 
extend leniency to companies willing to cooperate with DOJ investigations.
41
 
The policy aimed to prevent collateral consequences from harming people de-
pendent on the corporation but uninvolved in its misconduct. Structuring nego-
tiated settlements to avoid the specter of a “corporate death penalty” means, in 
practice, maintaining the business as a ﬁnancially healthy, going concern.
42
 Of 
course, all criminal convictions generate harmful collateral consequences, such 
as deportation, loss of public beneﬁts, labor-market exclusion, and familial 
trauma for defendants and their innocent dependents. But the strategic implica-
tions of a conviction’s collateral consequences depend on its political-economy 
context: individual convictions rarely produce systemic risk, layoffs, or perma-
nent shareholder losses, so there is no formal mechanism for capping those col-
lateral consequences. 
The TBTJ problem is not restricted to the ﬁnancial sector. In cases against 
nonﬁnancial companies, size, systemic importance, and political power have 
compelled government authorities to impose lesser penalties. For instance, the 
government has been reluctant to indict any of the remaining Big Four account-
ing ﬁrms, given their nodal position in regulating securities markets.
43
 There are 
other industries where government contracting is essential, so prosecutors are 
careful to avoid penalties leading to automatic debarments that would imperil 
government operations. This is common with respect to defense and intelligence 
 
.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ3D-V3WP]; see also JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 8, 
§ 9-28.1100. 
41. See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
42. Id. at 14-16. 
43. See id. at 67-68 (discussing DOJ’s decision in 2006 not to suspend KPMG from its contract 
to audit DOJ’s own books following a settlement for selling illegal tax shelters); TANINA ROS-
TAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX 
SHELTER INDUSTRY 309-17 (2014) (describing KPMG’s strategy in negotiating with DOJ as 
arguing that indicting the ﬁrm would lead to its collapse and that “the Big Four were ‘too few’ 
for KPMG to be allowed to fail”); see also Materials on Nonprosecution Agreement Between 
the Southern District of New York and Ernst & Young LLP, http://lib.law.virginia.edu 
/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/EY.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZV4 
-3F8K]. 










 Other companies, such as 
auto manufacturers, may be such large employers or wholesalers that it would 
be politically and economically harmful for prosecutors’ sanctions to damage 
their ﬁnances.
48
 Finally, some companies may be regarded as systemically im-
portant because they provide unique infrastructure services to telecommunica-
tions networks or ﬁnancial markets.
49
 Thus, the term TBTJ really represents any 
company the government deems too important or powerful to jail. 
 
44. See, e.g., Materials on Nonprosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and Textron Inc., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett 
/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/textron.pdf [https://perma.cc/BP3R-J63M]. 
45. See, e.g., Materials on Nonprosecution Agreement Between the Eastern District of Virginia, 
Central District of California, and Boeing Co., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett 
/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/boeing.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS38-8DNR] 
(discussing federal contracting fraud against the U.S. Air Force and NASA). 
46. See, e.g., Materials on Nonprosecution Agreement Between the Southern District of New York 
and Chevron Corp., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry
/agreements/chevron.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J87-PZLF] (discussing fraud in the Iraqi oil-
for-food program). 
47. See, e.g., Materials on Nonprosecution Agreement Between the Northern District of California 
and UPS, Inc., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry 
/agreements/UPS.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6GJ-5KMQ] (discussing the illegal distribution of 
controlled substances). 
48. See, e.g., Materials on Nonprosecution Agreement Between the Southern District of New York 
and General Motors Co., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry
/agreements/gm.pdf [https://perma.cc/B299-3KNL]. 
49. See Rena Steinzor & Anne Havemann, Too Big to Obey: Why BP Should Be Debarred, 36 WM. 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 81, 111 (2011) (describing how “large corporations with long 
records of misconduct have escaped debarment” and arguing that “the [Department of De-
fense] has persuaded itself that its major contractors are simply too big to debar”); Drury D. 
Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
775, 809-11 (2011) (describing how the federal government is too reliant on many large com-
panies guilty of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations to enforce a debarment); 
Scott H. Amey, Federal Contractor Misconduct: Failures of the Suspension and Debarment System, 
PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (May 10, 2002), http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports
/2002/co-fcm-20020510.html [https://perma.cc/9U9A-XBWC]. See generally GARRETT, su-
pra note 1, at 255 (discussing the TBTJ problem beyond the ﬁnancial industry). 
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i i .  corporate criminal liability 
A. Legal Constraints 
This Note focuses on prosecutorial strategy rather than judicial doctrine. As 
resolving corporate-crime prosecutions through negotiated settlements has be-
come normal, fewer cases are fully litigated. Consequently, negotiations take 
place in the shadow of the law, constrained more by nonbinding DOJ guidance 
and the practices of repeat players than by doctrine. Nevertheless, doctrine does 
present some constraints: at least one individual must be theoretically liable for 
a corporate criminal prosecution to proceed. 
Under federal criminal law, corporate criminal liability rests on the doctrine 
of respondeat superior
50
: a company’s criminal liability derives entirely from in-
dividuals’ actions and mental states, since “a corporation can act only through 
individuals.”
51
 The Justice Manual lays out the applicable test for corporate crim-
inal liability: 
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation may be held 
criminally liable for certain illegal acts of its directors, officers, employ-
ees, and agents. To hold a corporation liable for these actions, the gov-
ernment must establish that the corporate agent’s actions (i) were within 




Federal law is strict—a company is theoretically liable for the criminal acts of any 
employee. And because corporate criminal liability can only arise from individual 
criminal conduct, the presence of a corporation’s criminal prosecution suggests 
that some individual is liable too. 
Of course, this does not mean individuals will always be charged. Prosecu-
torial discretion lies at the core of the executive branch’s constitutional authority 
to determine law enforcement strategy.
53
 In deciding whether and how to pro-
ceed with charges, the executive branch weighs various policy considerations, 
including economic consequences.
54
 This discretion includes the decision 
 
50. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-95 (1909). 
51. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 8, § 9-28.210. 
52. Id. 
53. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979). 
54. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he balancing of 
various legal, practical, and political considerations, none of which is absolute, is the very 
essence of prosecutorial discretion.”). 
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whether to criminally charge a company, culpable individuals, both, or neither.
55
 
DOJ regulates charging discretion with the Justice Manual’s Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations, which describe the legal and policy con-
cerns prosecutors should consider.
56
 And while courts can dismiss improper 
charges, the judiciary can neither introduce alternative charges nor compel the 




Gary Becker’s classic study of crime as a rational choice inaugurated the eco-
nomic analysis of criminal deterrence.
58
 Deterrence theory assumes an individual 
will commit an unlawful act if the expected private beneﬁt is greater than the 
expected disutility of any sanctions. Under Becker’s model, the government 
should adopt a law enforcement policy that yields an expected penalty sufficient 
to force individuals to internalize the social costs of their behavior. Thus, crime 
is an agency cost of the divergence between the interests of the corporate criminal 
and society. 
The economic literature draws two policy conclusions. First, policy makers 
can achieve any given level of deterrence by trading off the severity of punish-
ment with the probability of conviction. Enforcement is costly, so Becker argues 
that under certain assumptions, optimal policy imposes maximal punishment to 
reduce law enforcement costs.
59
 This resolution to the certainty/severity trade-
off—minimal enforcement with maximal ﬁnes—has engendered a literature an-
alyzing how law enforcement regimes based on random crackdowns or self-re-
porting might increase policing efficiency.
60
 Using differential sanctions struc-
tures to induce defendants to fund internal investigations for prosecutors’ 
beneﬁt is an extension of this efficiency-driven strategy. 
 
55. See United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 746 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reversing a district 
court’s refusal to approve a DPA with a corporate defendant in part because no individuals 
were charged). 
56. See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 8, § 9-28.200. 
57. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 
357, 364 (1978). 
58. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
59. Id. at 183-84. 
60. See, e.g., Jan Eeckhout et al., A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 
1104 (2010). 
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Second, ﬁnes are the preferred sanction because they are socially costless 
transfer payments, while incarceration imposes social costs.
61
 This conclusion 
assumes that all punishments have a monetary equivalent, so prison is reserved 
for people unable to pay the socially necessary ﬁnes. Richard Posner agrees, ar-
guing that white-collar criminals should be subject to ﬁnes instead of incarcera-
tion, so long as they can pay.
62
 However, John C. Coffee argues that if a monetary 
equivalent to incarceration even exists in a meaningful sense, it is impossible to 
measure.
63
 Further, he argues that the white-collar criminal’s psychological re-
sponse to incarceration is such that society could achieve signiﬁcant deterrence 
even from short sentences. If this psychological response to incarceration is 
frontloaded, then draconian sentences are dispensable. Rather than threatening 
longer sentences, Coffee’s critique suggests that increasing the likelihood of 
prosecution optimally deters white-collar crime. 
Subsequent law-and-economics scholarship has extended Becker’s frame-
work to analyze corporate crime.
64
 These game-theoretic models use a principal-
agent structure ﬁrst applied to vicarious tort liability to explore how criminal 
liability ought to be distributed between ﬁrms and their employees.
65
 These 
agency models posit shareholder-principals trying to elicit proﬁt-maximizing 
management strategies from employee-agents.
66
 The basic setup posits a prin-
cipal, who seeks to achieve a particular outcome through the actions of a discrete 
agent, who chooses rationally how much effort to exert. Microeconomists ana-
lyze agency as a nested optimization problem: the principal chooses a contract 
that will motivate the agent to act as the principal wishes, while the information 
asymmetry between them introduces transaction costs. 
 
61. Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 
410 (1980). 
62. Id. at 415 (“For every prison sentence there is some ﬁne equivalent; if the ﬁne is so large that 
it cannot be collected, then the offender should be imprisoned.”). 
63. John Collins Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics 
of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 425 (1980). 
64. See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa, Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial 
Perspective, 21 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 243, 243-44 (2000); A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of 
Corporate Liability?, 13 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 239 (1993). 
65. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984). 
66. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (drawing on theories of agency, prop-
erty rights, and ﬁnance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the ﬁrm). But see Mar-
garet M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 
(1999) (critiquing the agency-theoretic model of the corporation). 
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In the corporate-crime context, there are three nested agency relationships. 
First, the manager acts as the agent of the corporation, which sets incentives 
through compensation and disciplinary rules. Second, the corporation acts as an 
agent of the government: prosecutors, acting as principals, aim to ensure com-
pliance with the law while facilitating a legal regime conducive to lawful busi-
ness. Thus, the prosecutor’s choice of enforcement policy will create incentives 
for the corporation as agent, which in turn structures employee incentives. And 
third, the manager interacts under an agency relationship directly with prosecu-
tors, who seek to deter criminal conduct by threatening individual prosecution. 
Much of the law-and-economics literature has argued that crime within a 
corporation is an agency cost, arising from an employee acting against the cor-
poration’s interest by substituting malfeasance for honest performance.
67
 Thus, 
the agency view is less useful for understanding “control frauds”—a term coined 
by William Black to describe situations in which a controller or other insider uses 
the corporate form as an instrumentality of his criminal malfeasance, setting up 
or operating the company to achieve an unlawful purpose such as tax evasion, 
smuggling, or fraud.
68
 Econometric evidence supports the theoretical literature’s 




If there is consensus among law-and-economics scholars, it is that no single 
optimal mix of criminal liability for individual employees and vicarious liability 
exists for business organizations.
70
 Many analyses assume individuals will be 
held accountable and then ask when, if ever, vicarious corporate liability is war-
ranted. Scholars have supported vicarious liability when the employer can mon-
itor employee wrongdoing more efficiently than the government can or when 
individual employees are unable to pay the optimal ﬁnes.
71
 Scholars and policy 
makers chieﬂy justify corporate criminal liability by arguing that penalties force 
companies to internalize the costs of criminality and so provide an incentive to 
invest in compliance operations and internal controls. Jennifer Arlen and Reinier 
 
67. See, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? Own-
ership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 1-4 (1999); Jonathan R. 
Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 334 (1991). 
68. WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE EXEC-
UTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 1-6 (2d ed. 2014). 
69. Alexander & Cohen, supra note 67, at 2 (ﬁnding that empirical analysis supports the hypoth-
esis that corporate crime reﬂects an intraﬁrm agency cost). 
70. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of 
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 694 (1997). 
71. See Alexander, supra note 7, at 23-24; Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice 
Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1362-66 (1982). 
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Kraakman have found that corporate liability, if properly structured, may en-
courage companies to develop costly internal controls.
72
 In general, when it ﬁnds 
corporate liability justiﬁed, the law-and-economics literature expresses a prefer-
ence for penalties that do not impose substantive mandates for internal reform.
73
 
But corporate liability has also been called counterproductive. For instance, 
Jonathan Macey contends that vicarious corporate criminal liability creates real 
social costs because penalizing shareholders through vicarious liability discour-
ages already risk-averse managers from acting even when the beneﬁts outweigh 
the costs. Macey argues that managers’ self-interest makes them more risk averse 
than shareholders and concludes that “[i]n large, publicly held corporations, it 
seems highly implausible that managers are selected on the basis of their will-
ingness to engage in criminal activity.”
74
 Others contend that “subjecting busi-
ness entities to criminal liability carrying severe collateral consequences might, 
in fact, undermine deterrence” and that “purely ﬁnancial penalties could contain 
misconduct more effectively than the threat of going out of business.”
75
 
Since large companies face penalties more frequently than their culpable in-
dividual employees do, the strategic question is more properly reversed: given 
corporate liability, when should prosecutors pursue individual charges? Some 
believe that “an enforcement strategy of only imposing sanctions on sharehold-
ers can be sufficient in some instances.”
76
 Or as one study put it, “deterrence can 
typically be obtained at minimum social cost by sanctioning the ﬁrm alone.”
77
 
Nevertheless, the literature does consider individual liability to be important 
in certain circumstances. When incarceration is necessary for deterrence,
78
 when 
a company is unable to effectively monitor or discipline its employees,
79
 and 
when the government seeks to pressure employees to cooperate against the 
ﬁrm,
80
 individual liability can be an essential tool. 
 
72. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 70, at 730-35 (describing how composite liability regimes may 
incentivize efficient internal policing). 
73. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through Nonprose-
cution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 325, 352-53 (2017). 
74. See Macey, supra note 67, at 325. 
75. Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 274 
(2008). 
76. Alexander, supra note 7, at 33. 
77. Mullin & Snyder, supra note 6, at 32. 
78. See id. at 41. 
79. Id.; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 64, at 240-41. 
80. Mullin & Snyder, supra note 6, at 40. 
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Beyond the question of individual liability, the literature has not contended 
with the question of whether a large ﬁrm’s political and economic power should 
alter prosecutorial strategy. Some scholars have tried to assume away the prob-
lem: Macey, for example, has argued that corporate crime should be more com-
mon in smaller ﬁrms than in large ones, because managers in smaller ﬁrms can 
capture a larger share of the proﬁts gained by criminal activities.
81
 Jennifer Arlen 
and Marcel Kahan have recognized that publicly held companies may have gov-
ernance structures that increase policing agency costs, and so ought to be subject 
to greater mandates for internal reform, but their analysis is unconnected to po-
litical or economic power.
82
 Some analytic models of corporate criminal liability 
expressly or implicitly assume that ﬁrms have unlimited liability.
83
 It is a familiar 
result that where one party in a principal-agent relationship is judgment proof, 
criminal deterrence may only be possible by sanctioning the other party.
84
 But 
the TBTJ problem diverges from this analysis because, unlike a judgment-proof 
company, the TBTJ ﬁrm survives its sanction as a ﬁscally sound, going concern. 
This Note is thus the ﬁrst to consider how ﬁrm power and market concentration 
alter the analysis of corporate criminal liability. 
The microeconomic model that forms this Note’s analytical core is based on 
one developed by Nuno Garoupa.
85
 Garoupa begins with individual liability and 
asks whether corporate liability should be imposed at all.
86
 His model starts with 
a manager whose effort exertion is unobservable to the ﬁrm and costly to the 
manager but who can also choose to exert some amount of socially harmful effort 
that produces a private beneﬁt. Garoupa argues that individual ﬁnes are more 
efficient than corporate ﬁnes because the latter distort intraﬁrm incentives at the 
cost of productive efficiency. Thus, he argues that corporate liability is only effi-
cient when an employee has insufficient wealth to internalize the costs of crime. 
He acknowledges that nonmonetary sanctions on individuals can be a partial 
source of deterrence, but he dismisses them as overly expensive.
87
 Garoupa also 
 
81. Macey, supra note 67, at 323-24. 
82. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 73, at 353-55. 
83. See, e.g., Mullin & Snyder, supra note 6, at 41-42. 
84. Id. at 42; Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45 (1986). 
85. See Garoupa, supra note 64, at 245. 
86. Id. at 244 (“In a perfect world . . . individual liability alone would induce efficient behavior. 
Consequently, corporate liability would not be necessary. Conversely, corporate liability is 
worthwhile investigating when contracts are incomplete or when solvency matters.” (citation 
omitted)). 
87. Id. (“Imposing non-monetary sanctions (e.g. imprisonment sentences) is a partial solution to 
the problem of agents’ insufficient wealth. Imprisonment, however, is expensive and usually 
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shows that when ﬁrms are subject to corporate liability, they can reduce the re-
sulting intraﬁrm incentive distortion by funding internal-control mechanisms, 
such as corporate compliance departments. He therefore concludes law enforce-
ment policy can always elicit corporate cooperation with government investiga-




This Note incorporates several new features into the Garoupa model. First, 
it adds a constraint to represent situations when the defendant ﬁrm is TBTJ. The 
core contribution of this Note’s model is explaining how a TBTJ constraint alters 
the optimal law enforcement strategy relative to Garoupa’s baseline. Second, this 
Note introduces the possibility of punishing culpable individuals with non-
monetary sanctions. The strategic importance of credibly threatening culpable 
individuals with incarceration or nonmonetary sanctions arises when defendant 
ﬁrms become TBTJ. 
i i i .  the economic model:  too-big-to-jail  prosecution 
The high concentration of many economic sectors and the profusion of large, 
politically powerful ﬁrms have led the TBTJ problem to dominate corporate 
criminal prosecutors’ decision-making. Yet the law-and-economics literature on 
corporate criminal liability has not considered the strategic implications of the 
TBTJ constraint. This Part adapts Garoupa’s game-theoretic model of corporate 
criminal liability, introducing a TBTJ constraint and evaluating the deterrence 
achieved by various prosecutorial strategies.
89
 This new model shows that when 
a ﬁrm becomes TBTJ, it can expect to proﬁt from certain crimes even when it 
may confront corporate prosecution. Thus, the ﬁrm may lack incentive to coop-
erate with government investigations in good faith. Given this, prosecutors seek-
ing to deter corporate crime by TBTJ ﬁrms should adjust their strategies to rely 
less heavily on internal investigations, to focus more intently on charging culpa-
ble individuals, and to insist that guilty corporations adopt structural-reform 
provisions in negotiated settlements. 
The model considers a hypothetical prosecutor pursuing criminal charges 
against a corporation and a culpable manager for criminal conduct that resulted 
from the manager’s choice to exert effort in an antisocial but proﬁtable direction. 
 
courts are not willing to impose it. Thus, corporate liability is the other possible solution.” 
(citation omitted)). 
88. Id. at 249-50; see also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Lia-
bility, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 835-36 (1994) (describing the conditions under which corporate 
criminal liability elicits ﬁrms’ cooperation with the government). 
89. See Garoupa, supra note 64, at 245-46. 
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The manager makes this choice rationally with respect to the incentives laid be-
fore him. The model permits the prosecutor to pursue three types of sanctions: 
(1) ﬁning the company; (2) ﬁning the manager; or (3) imposing a nonmonetary 
penalty on the manager, such as incarceration, an industry ban, or a set of re-
storative-justice requirements. The TBTJ constraint is represented by an upper 
limit on the corporate ﬁne that the prosecutor may impose, reﬂecting the back-
ground political economy. The ﬁrm can choose to police its employees by invest-
ing in an internal compliance department, which would “cooperate” with the 
government by reporting employee wrongdoing to the prosecutor. The pros-
ecutor can in turn encourage the ﬁrm to do so by giving the ﬁrm “cooperation 
credit”—that is, a discount on the corporate ﬁne for voluntarily disclosed indi-
vidual criminal conduct. 
After deﬁning the model’s game-theoretic structure in Section III.A, I pre-
sent the model in three stages, adding new complications at each step. Section 
III.B considers a circumstance without any information asymmetry within the 
ﬁrm. That is, the manager cannot hide his actions from the corporation, which 
can specify exactly how the manager should act. This analysis shows why TBTJ 
corporations may ﬁnd criminality proﬁtable when the prosecutor does not cred-
ibly threaten the manager with nonmonetary sanctions. (Additional details un-
derlying the derivation appear in Appendix A.1, the mathematical appendix.) 
Second, Section III.C discusses the implications of information asymmetry 
within the ﬁrm, where the manager can hide his actions and the corporation 
cannot specify exactly how he should work. This is a stepping stone to the full 
model. (Mathematical details are worked out in Appendix A.2.) 
Finally, Section III.D presents the full model. Here, the corporation may 
choose to invest in a costly system of internal controls, such as a compliance de-
partment. When these internal controls detect wrongdoing by the manager, the 
ﬁrm will report it to the government. While self-reporting employee crime may 
subject the ﬁrm to prosecution, the government incentivizes self-reporting be-
havior by giving the ﬁrm a “discount” on its ﬁne relative to the ﬁne imposed if 
the government detects the wrongdoing independently. 
Parts IV and V proceed to draw conclusions and strategic implications from 
the model. In brief, these Parts show that when a ﬁrm becomes TBTJ, the gov-
ernment may be unable to effectively induce the ﬁrm to cooperate with prosecu-
tors in good faith. Algebra-averse readers solely interested in the model’s legal 
and policy implications may skip to Part VI without losing the argument’s 
thread. 
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A. Outline of the Law Enforcement Game 
This Note’s model adopts the same basic setup from Garoupa’s original pa-
per.
90
 It posits three actors—the government, a risk-neutral ﬁrm, and a risk-neu-
tral manager—as players in a sequential, one-period game. The manager exerts 
two forms of effort: one that is productive for the ﬁrm and socially acceptable 
(m) and another that is proﬁtable for the manager, socially harmful, and illegal 
(n). Exerting socially harmful effort raises the risk that some damage is realized. 
When the manager engages in the illegal conduct and the damage materializes, 
he has satisﬁed the elements of a crime. That is, the manager can be convicted of 
a crime if and only if he caused the unlawful event to occur. The model describes 
a regime of strict, vicarious liability, in which the manager’s guilt is directly and 
necessarily imputed to his employer. As with federal criminal law’s respondeat 
superior rule, the ﬁrm is criminally liable if and only if the manager is. 
The game initially proceeds in the following order: 
1.  The government “announces” a criminal justice policy, which is public 
knowledge. The policy includes several parameters. First, the govern-
ment institutes a level of costly investigation and enforcement to detect, 
convict, and punish with a probability σ, conditional on a crime having 
been committed. Second, the government chooses to impose a ﬁne of Sf 
on the ﬁrm if the manager is caught committing a crime.
91
 Third, it 
chooses sanctions to impose on the manager if he is caught and pros-
ecuted. This could include a ﬁne Sm and a period of incarceration π. As 
noted earlier, the law enforcement policy can include any mix of individ-
ual and corporate sanctions, including no sanction for one party if the 
prosecutor decides to indict one but not the other. However, the pros-
ecutor’s choice is constrained by the defendants’ ability to pay: the man-
ager has maximum recoverable wealth of 𝑊ഥ  and, if the ﬁrm is TBTJ, 
then it can be made to pay no more than 𝜉. 
2.  The ﬁrm offers the manager a contract that pays a ﬁxed wage ω and a 
share μ of total revenue. As discussed in Section III.D, the ﬁrm may also 
decide how much to invest in an internal-control mechanism, such as a 
compliance department, to supervise the manager and report wrongdo-
ing to the government. 
 
90. See id. at 245-46. 
91. As discussed infra Section III.D, when the ﬁrm endogenously chooses to cooperate, the gov-
ernment will also select a discounted corporate ﬁne of SR for when the ﬁrm self-reports em-
ployee wrongdoing to prosecutors. 
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3.  Finally, the manager chooses how to conduct business. His choice of 
productive and socially harmful effort is the pair of continuous variables 
⟨m, n⟩, respectively. The manager can choose to exert any amount or 
combination of productive and socially harmful effort. 
The players are rational in the traditional microeconomic sense: the govern-
ment maximizes social welfare, the ﬁrm maximizes expected proﬁt, and the 
manager maximizes expected utility. Using backward induction, one can solve 
for a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for the strategy that achieves socially optimal de-
terrence of corporate crime. That is, given how the ﬁrm will respond to the gov-
ernment’s law enforcement policy and how the manager will respond to the 
combined incentives from the government and his employer, prosecutors will 
choose a strategy that most efficiently deters corporate crime. 
The ﬁrm produces a single output with technology 𝐺ሺ𝑚, 𝑛ሻ ൌ 𝑚 ൅ 𝑛 and a 
price normalized to unity, so revenue is 𝑚 ൅ 𝑛. The ﬁrm offers the manager a 
contract with a ﬁxed wage ω and a share μ of revenue. The manager can choose 
to either exert normal productive effort 𝑚 or engage in socially harmful and il-
legal conduct with an effort choice of 𝑛. The manager experiences a combined 
personal disutility of 𝐶ሺ𝑚, 𝑛ሻ from either exertion.92 The manager also receives 
a private beneﬁt 𝐸ሺ𝑛ሻ from the socially harmful action that he does not share 
with the company, such as a bribe or a kickback.
93
 Thus, the manager’s utility 
function is 
𝑈 ൌ 𝜔 ൅ 𝜇ሺ𝑚 ൅ 𝑛ሻ ൅ 𝐸ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝐶ሺ𝑚, 𝑛ሻ െ 𝜏ሺ𝑛; 𝜎, 𝑆௠, 𝜋ሻ,  (1) 
where 𝜏ሺ𝑛; 𝜎, 𝑆௠, 𝜋ሻ is the manager’s expected punishment as a function of his 
effort choice and the law enforcement policy. 
Socially damaging behavior does not alone determine whether a crime has 
been committed. Following Garoupa, criminal liability attaches only under the 
condition 𝑛 ൅ 𝜍 ൐ 0, where u is a random variable with known cumulative dis-
tribution function 𝐹ሺ𝜍ሻ. This random factor 𝜍 represents an exogenous determi-
nant of whether the manager’s illegal behavior produces the result element of 
the crime, such as the investor’s loss in a securities fraud. For example, 𝜍 might 
be related to market conditions that cause a fraudulent investment scheme to 
collapse. The antisocial effort n corresponds to intentional actions by the indi-
vidual that bring about a completed criminal act under the right conditions. For 
example, n could represent effort expended to create a fraudulent investment 
 
92. The disutility to the manager of exerting both forms of effort is increasing and convex: 𝐶௡ ൐0, 𝐶௠ ൐ 0, 𝐶௡௡ ൐ 0, 𝐶௠௠ ൐ 0, and 𝐶௠௡ ൌ 𝐶௡௠ ൐ 0. 
93. The private beneﬁt to the manager of socially harmful effort is increasing in the harmful-effort 
level because 𝐸௡ ൐ 0, but there is a diminishing marginal return because 𝐸௡௡ ൏ 0. 
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scheme that loses money and is discovered only when market conditions sour. 
The probability that a crime has occurred is 𝑃𝑟ሺcrimeሻ ൌ 𝑃𝑟ሺ𝑛 ൅ 𝜍 ൐ 0ሻ ൌ 1 െ
𝐹ሺെ𝑛ሻ ൌ 𝑃ሺ𝑛ሻ.94 If a crime does occur, it imposes a harm 𝐻 ൐ 0 on society. In 
sum, the occurrence of a crime with ﬁxed social cost H depends on both the 
manager’s antisocial effort choice n and exogenous conditions 𝜍. 
The ﬁrm’s share of the output produced with the manager’s effort is 
ሺ1 െ 𝜇ሻ𝐺ሺ𝑚, 𝑛ሻ. If the manager’s actions result in a crime that the prosecutor 
detects, the ﬁrm is ﬁned an amount Sf. Thus, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is 
𝐵 ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝜇ሻሺ𝑚 ൅ 𝑛ሻ െ 𝜔 െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛ሻ𝜎𝑆௙.  (2) 
Neither managerial utility nor proﬁt depends on whether a crime occurs. 
However, if a crime occurs, the government can detect and successfully prosecute 
with probability σ. The government can impose three types of sanctions follow-
ing a successful prosecution, depending on its announced crime-ﬁghting strat-
egy. If a corporate liability regime is in effect, the ﬁrm faces a ﬁne of 𝑆௙. The 
manager faces a combination of two sentences: a ﬁne 𝑆௠ and a period π of in-
carceration. This incarceration generates expected disutility 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ to the manager 
and imposes social costs 𝐷ሺ𝜋ሻ. The ﬁnes are transfer payments, so they do not 
affect social welfare. 
The government sets law enforcement policy so as to maximize social wel-
fare. Social welfare is the sum of managerial utility (U) and ﬁrm proﬁts (B), net 
of the expected social harm of the crime and its punishment: 
𝑊 ൌ 𝑈 ൅ 𝐵 െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛ሻሾ𝐻 ൅ 𝐷ሺ𝜋ሻሿ.   (3) 
The U.S. criminal justice system generally imposes long prison sentences, 
but as noted earlier, brief incarceration may produce sufficiently strong deter-
rence.
95
 Many of the personal costs of incarceration appear immediately: family 
disruptions, stigma of criminal conviction, and psychological adjustment to lost 
freedom. Even though other costs grow over time, draconian sentences are us-
ually unnecessary to serve a deterrence function. Mathematically, this appears as 
the disutility of incarceration function 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ, which is highly concave with a very 
steep slope for low values of π.96 As a consequence, managers subject to pros-
ecution for corporate crimes will be risk seekers with respect to incarceration, 
 
94. The probability of the social harm being realized is increasing in n: 𝑃௡ ൐ 0. 
95. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 470. 
96. The period of incarceration is at least zero, and the disutility of incarceration to the manager 
is concave, so 𝜋 ൒ 0, 𝐽ሺ0ሻ ൌ 0, 𝐽గ ൐ 0, 𝐽గగ ൏ 0. The social costs of incarceration, such as 
prison operating costs and lost productivity, increase linearly with the period of incarceration: 
𝐷ሺ0ሻ ൌ 0,  𝐷గ ൌ 𝑑. 
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even though they are risk-neutral overall.
97
 While this Note generally refers to 
incarceration, this term is really a stand-in for nonmonetary sanctions imposed 
on individual wrongdoers. Thus, alternative sanctions that place the burden on 
individual managers, such as industry bans, restorative-justice initiatives, com-
munity service requirements, or some combination thereof, could suffice.
98
 The 
point is not that incarceration per se is a necessary response to white-collar crime 
but that ﬁnes alone may not be a sufficient deterrent for many corporate crimes. 
B. Observable-Effort Baseline 
We begin with the simplest case: the manager’s conduct is fully transparent 
and the corporation can contract for a speciﬁc level and type of managerial ef-
fort.
99
 The observable-effort case serves as a baseline model of deterrence be-
cause the problem of corporate crime reduces to a single agency relationship be-
tween the government and the ﬁrm. The divergence between the ﬁrm’s proﬁt 
function and the government’s social-welfare function creates the space for 
agency costs. This model closely follows the principal-agent framework devel-
oped in Garoupa
100
 but adds the possibility of sentencing the manager to prison. 
It concludes that, when a defendant ﬁrm is TBTJ and has engaged in criminal 
conduct that is highly proﬁtable and seriously harmful, corporate ﬁnes alone 
may not adequately deter criminal activity. Instead, optimal deterrence requires 
that prosecutors impose individual liability on managers, including a credible 
threat of incarceration. 
Socially optimal deterrence requires that the ﬁrm and the manager together 
fully internalize the costs of their crime. That is, criminal penalties act as a Pigou-
vian tax, weighted by the probability of detection and punishment. A criminal 
control policy that forces the ﬁrm and the manager to fully internalize the costs 
of crime must therefore satisfy the joint condition
101
 
𝑆௙ ൅ 𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ ൌ ுା஽ሺగሻఙ .   (4) 
 
97. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 431 (arguing that the traditional microeconomic assumption that 
individuals are risk-averse should not apply to organizational criminal defendants operating 
under uncertainty). 
98. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 
(1996) (exploring arguments for and against alternative sanctions to imprisonment such as 
community service). 
99. The details of the derivation, which closely follow Garoupa’s model, see Garoupa, supra note 
64, appear in Appendix A.1. 
100. See Garoupa, supra note 64, at 245-46. 
101. See infra text accompanying equations (16)-(21) in Appendix A.1. 
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While (4) jointly deﬁnes an enforcement strategy that fully internalizes the costs 
of corporate crime, prosecutors face two important constraints in their charging 
and sentencing decisions. 
First, in cases of serious corporate wrongdoing, even highly paid executives 
are unlikely to have sufficient recoverable wealth for a ﬁne to fully internalize the 
social harms of large corporate crimes. Following Garoupa, let 𝑊ഥ represent the 
maximum collectable ﬁne that can be imposed on the manager.
102
 This imposes 
an individual-wealth constraint 𝑆௠ ൑ 𝑊ഥ  on the government’s choice of the 
manager’s ﬁne. If the crime’s social harm weighted by the probability of discov-
ery is high enough ሺ𝑊ഥ ൏ ு / ఙሻ, then the individual-wealth constraint binds the 
prosecutor, and individual ﬁnes alone fail to fully internalize the costs of crime. 
If this constraint binds, then the remaining deterrence must be achieved through  
corporate ﬁnes and the threat of incarceration: 𝑆௙ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ ൌ ுା஽ሺగሻఙ െ 𝑊ഥ . Becker  
and other law-and-economics scholars argue incarceration is a second-best pun-
ishment because it imposes substantial social costs, so prosecutors should  
exhaust the utility of ﬁnes before turning to custodial sentences.
103
 Absent the  
threat of prison, the optimal corporate ﬁne reduces to 𝑆௙ ൌ ுఙ െ 𝑊ഥ . 
Second, the political economy of the TBTJ problem limits the total ﬁscal pain 
that the government can impose on systemically important ﬁrms. The model 
represents this practical upper bound on corporate liability as the collectable-
wealth constraint 𝑆௙ ൑ 𝜉, which will be called the TBTJ constraint. If the gov-
ernment has adopted a criminal justice policy in which management is not cred-
ibly threatened with incarceration, then the sum of penalties has an upper bound 
of 𝑊ഥ ൅ 𝜉. In this policy regime, if the following condition holds, then rational 




 .    (5) 
Because deterrence regimes operate in expectation—that is, what matters for a 
manager’s decision to commit antisocial behavior today depends on his under-
standing of the government’s prosecutorial strategy—underdeterrence can hold 
whether 𝜋 ൌ 0 is a de jure or de facto policy. Thus, when both the individual-
wealth and TBTJ constraints bind, a crime is harmful enough for (5) to hold, 
 
102. See Garoupa, supra note 64, at 245-46. 
103. See Becker, supra note 58, at 193; Posner, supra note 61, at 410 (“[T]he white-collar crimi-
nal . . . should be punished only by monetary penalties—by ﬁnes (where civil damages or 
penalties are inadequate or inappropriate) rather than by imprisonment or other ‘afflictive’ 
punishments.”); see also Kahan, supra note 98, at 619-20 (presenting economists’ arguments 
in favor of ﬁnes). 
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and there is no threat of incarceration, then the ﬁrm and its employees know ex 
ante that the government cannot force them to absorb the full costs of their an-
tisocial behavior. The ﬁrm’s decisions will therefore generate negative external-
ities—a socially suboptimal situation. 
If incarceration is a sentencing option, then (4) dictates that the socially op-
timal expected period of incarceration should account for the deterrent effect of 
realistic ﬁnes. The length of incarceration that would fully internalize the costs 
of crime is given by
104
 
𝜋 ൌ 𝐽ିଵ ቂுା஽ሺగሻఙ െ 𝑊ഥ െ 𝜉ቃ.   (6) 
Thus, where the TBTJ constraint binds sentencing decisions, socially optimal 
deterrence is only possible when 𝜋 ൐ 0 because the right side of the equation is 
necessarily positive for any harmful crime. As discussed in Section II.B, it is likely 
that even a short period of incarceration will satisfy (6) in most cases, since so 
much of incarceration’s disutility is frontloaded. Recall that Michael Polinsky 
and Steven Shavell argued that imposing individual criminal liability can raise 
deterrence beyond a corporate-liability-only policy when the government’s 
sanction on the manager is harsher than the ﬁrm’s maximum possible sanc-
tion.
105
 Since only the government can incarcerate an individual defendant, their 
criterion clearly holds here. 
This perfect-information scenario simpliﬁes the agency problems in play, es-
tablishing a baseline and clearly showing how the TBTJ problem changes be-
havior. Adding a TBTJ constraint to this model of organizational crime shows 
that criminal authorities with ﬁnite enforcement resources cannot cause TBTJ 
ﬁrms to fully internalize the costs of corporate crime without credibly threaten-




104. 𝐽ିଵሺ∙ሻ exists because 𝐽గ ൐ 0 by assumption. 
105. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 64, at 251. 
106. In Becker’s standard framework, increasing the probability of punishment reliably decreases 
the crime rate. Since enforcement is costly and authorities have ﬁxed budgets set by outside 
authorities, it is not always possible to increase the probability of conviction. But Becker’s 
certainty/severity trade-off dictates that it is always possible to disincentivize criminality by 
increasing the applicable sentences. Here, assume that the prosecutor’s level of enforcement 
σ is maximal given a ﬁxed—but unspeciﬁed—enforcement budget, so he cannot willingly in-
crease the probability of conviction. In this context and in the presence of a TBTJ ﬁrm, the 
only remaining margin for tightening criminal justice policy is individual liability. 
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C. Moral Hazard 
In no large company do corporate shareholders and directors have perfect 
knowledge of managers’ actions. And if a manager conducts business in a man-
ner that may invite criminal charges, then shareholders and directors are even 
less likely to have visibility into his actions. Thus, a more fulsome analysis of 
corporate criminality requires modeling intraﬁrm information asymmetries. 
These asymmetries create moral hazard, which has long been identiﬁed as a pri-
mary cause of corporate criminality.
107
 
Introducing moral hazard does not substantially change the policy implica-
tions with respect to the TBTJ constraint from those ascertainable in the perfect-
information case presented in Section III.A. Moreover, Garoupa’s original paper 
comprehensively analyzes the extension from the full-information context to the 
moral-hazard context.
108
 Thus, a complete derivation of the model with infor-
mation asymmetries is limited to Appendix A.2. 
The main implication of this jump from full information to the intraﬁrm in-
formation asymmetry is that the moral hazard adds a second-level, nested 
agency relationship between the ﬁrm and its manager to the relationships ema-
nating from the prosecutor. This added agency relationship requires the ﬁrm to 
create an incentive structure such that the manager will rationally choose to max-
imize productive effort and minimize illegal conduct. As Garoupa explained, this 
information asymmetry introduces intraﬁrm-incentive distortions that reduce 
productive efficiency relative to the perfect-information baseline.
109
 I represent 
the cost of those incentive distortions as 𝜁ሺ𝜇ሻ. However, the implications of the 
TBTJ problem are unchanged relative to the perfect-information baseline: ab-
sent a credible threat of nonmonetary sanctions for culpable managers, prosecu-
tors will be unable to sufficiently deter crime by employees of TBTJ corpora-
tions. 
D. Moral Hazard with Internal Controls 
Most large ﬁrms invest in legal compliance departments to monitor employ-
ees.
110
 Internal-control mechanisms improve intraﬁrm incentives, reducing pro-
ductive inefficiency. However, investing in costly internal controls depends on 
 
107. See Alexander, supra note 7; see also supra Part II. 
108. Garoupa, supra note 64, at 246-48. 
109. Id. at 246-47. 
110. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 951-52 (2009); 
Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting 
Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 707-14 (2002). 
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corporate exposure to criminal sanction. The model demonstrates that the TBTJ 
problem disfavors corporate investment in employee supervision and coopera-
tion with criminal investigations. 
The ﬁrm can monitor the manager’s activities through a compliance depart-
ment more efficiently than outside law enforcement can because employers have 
insider knowledge of their workers’ responsibilities, conduct, and communica-
tions. If the ﬁrm detects wrongdoing by a manager, it is expected to report the 
crime to the government. For the ﬁrm to detect employee wrongdoing with 
probability ρ, it will have to spend an amount 𝑇ሺ𝜌ሻ on supervision.111 
The government has two ways of inducing companies to invest in internal 
controls and report wrongdoing to regulators. First, it can directly mandate in-
ternal controls through corporate law, securities laws, or sectoral regulations.
112
 
Second, the government can create economic incentives for ﬁrms to invest in 
internal controls as a means of reducing vicarious liability for employee malfea-
sance. If these internal controls are costly to implement, and if the crime imposes 
few direct costs on the ﬁrm, then corporate liability is necessary to induce the 
ﬁrm to invest in a compliance department. Internal controls can reduce the inci-
dence of employee malfeasance through deterrence and discipline. But the gov-
ernment also incentivizes this investment by providing corporate defendants 
with discounts on ﬁnes for operating a properly functioning compliance system 
and for self-reporting employee wrongdoing. Since these economic incentives 
are the model’s focus, for now we will ignore general regulatory and corporate 
law requirements that ﬁrms have compliance programs. 
To permit the government to strengthen ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in inter-
nal controls, a new term in the set of policy parameters, SR, will represent the 
ﬁne imposed on the corporation when it self-reports the manager’s wrongdoing 
to the government. Sf remains the ﬁne imposed on the ﬁrm when government 
detects the wrongdoing.
113
 The manager is subject to the same sentence regard-
less of how he is caught. 
Now subject to the ﬁrm’s monitoring, the manager’s utility is 
                              𝑈 ൌ 𝜔 ൅ 𝜇ሺ𝑚 ൅ 𝑛ሻ ൅ 𝐸ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝐶ሺ𝑛, 𝑚ሻ 
      െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛ሻሾ𝜌 ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎ሿሾ𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻሿ.  (7) 
 
111. 𝑇ఘ ൐ 0. 
112. See Baer, supra note 110; see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2018) (imposing a compliance regime 
on investment companies). 
113. While it makes sense for ﬁrms to get a “discount” on their liabilities when they cooperate with 
the government by turning over evidence of employee wrongdoing, Garoupa shows that 𝑆ோ ൏𝑆௙ is insufficient to incentivize the ﬁrm to fund internal controls. See Garoupa, supra note 64, 
at 250. 
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Because effort is unobservable, the manager optimizes his effort choice subject 
to the criminal-policy and compliance parameters. Given the manager’s response 
to intraﬁrm incentives, the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt by choosing both the revenue-
sharing factor μ and how much to invest in strengthening its compliance depart-
ment ρ.114 
The manager chooses to maximize his productive effort 𝑚෥  when he receives 
the entire revenue ሺ𝜇 ൌ 1ሻ. But so long as the ﬁrm faces some corporate liability, 
it will require some retained earnings to compensate for its legal risk, and so the 
ﬁrm will be unwilling to pay the manager the full value of his effort.
115
 Absent 
corporate liability, however, the ﬁrm has no incentive to invest in costly compli-
ance measures. Algebraically, if there are no corporate ﬁnes, 〈𝑆ோ ൌ 0, 𝑆௙ ൌ 0〉, 
then the ﬁrm will not detect and report any managerial wrongdoing ሺ𝜌 ൌ 0ሻ. 
However, an internal-control mechanism improves intraﬁrm incentives because 
increasing compliance-department strength ρ decreases the manager’s choice of 
antisocial effort for any given revenue share μ.116 Thus, by employing an inter-
nal-control mechanism, the ﬁrm can achieve any speciﬁed level of deterrence 
while sacriﬁcing less productive efficiency than it can without a compliance de-
partment. 
As before, the government sets optimal criminal policy by maximizing social 
welfare.
117
 Building on Garoupa by imposing both binding individual-wealth 
and TBTJ constraints, the optimal period of incarceration is given by 
𝜋 ൌ 𝐽ିଵ ቂ ுା஽ሺగሻఘାሺଵିఘሻఙ െ 𝑊ഥ െ 𝜉 െ 𝜁ሺ𝜇ሻቃ.   (8) 
Since 𝜌 ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎 is increasing in ρ, equation (8) shows that as the ﬁrm in-
creases the strength of its compliance function, prosecutors can impose shorter 
prison sentences and maintain deterrence strength. In other words, employees 
of ﬁrms with strong compliance departments should expect to be caught com-
mitting crimes more often but need not face punishment as severe as those work-
ing in companies without such internal controls. 
Relying solely on corporate liability makes the underdeterrence problem 
worse. If ﬁrms and managers expect that the government will not impose indi-
vidual liability on managers, then the TBTJ constraint will bind when 
𝐻 ൒ ሾ𝜌 ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎ሿሺ𝜉ሻ െ 𝜁ሺ𝜇ሻ.   (9) 
 
114. This derivation of the ﬁrm’s contract set ⟨𝜇෤, 𝜌෤⟩, conditional on the announced law enforce-
ment policy, is worked out in the mathematical appendix. See infra Appendix A.3. 
115. This conclusion follows from equations (41) and (33). See infra Appendix A.3. 
116. See id. at equation (34); see also Garoupa, supra note 64, at 249. 
117. For details of this derivation, see infra Appendix B. 
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Comparing equations (9) and (46), it is clear that the TBTJ constraint will bind 
the prosecutor’s charging decision at lower levels of social harm H without indi-
vidual liability than when managers are subject to ﬁnes, so crime control will be 
further from its social optimum. 
Even if the manager faces a ﬁne, when the TBTJ constraint binds, fully in-
ternalizing the social costs of crime is impossible without incarceration, as it is 
the only remaining margin in sentencing for making the ﬁrm and its manager 
internalize the costs of crime. Because the ﬁrm must offer the manager an em-
ployment contract that satisﬁes his incentive-compatibility constraint to elicit its 
desired effort level ⟨𝑛෤, 𝑚෥⟩, the ﬁrm pays the “price” of crime not only through 
corporate ﬁnes but also through employee wages and revenue shares μ. If the 
criminal justice policy protects managers from the threat of incarceration, the 
maximum expected sanction a TBTJ ﬁrm will face when it elicits a given level of 
effort 𝑛෤ is 
𝛯ሺ𝑛෤ሻ ൌ 𝑃ሺ𝑛෤ሻሾ𝜌 ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎ሿሺ𝜉 ൅ 𝑊ഥ ሻ.  (10) 
But the highest credible threat is likely to be even less because, as the next Part 
explains, TBTJ ﬁrms will not invest in a compliance function that reports 
wrongdoing to the government. Mathematically, this means that if a ﬁrm is 
TBTJ, 𝜌 ൌ 0 will hold in equation (10). If the government is not expected to 
incarcerate the manager, then the TBTJ ﬁrm will expect to proﬁt from increasing 
its managers’ exertion of socially harmful effort 𝑛෤ when 
𝐸௡ሺ𝑛෤ሻ ൐ 𝐶௡ሺ𝑛෤; 𝑚෥ሻ ൅ 𝛯௡ሺ𝑛෤ሻ െ 1.   (11)118 
That is, encouraging antisocial activity will be proﬁtable for the TBTJ ﬁrm so 
long as the manager’s marginal private beneﬁt from further cheating is greater 
than the marginal disutility of that effort and increased costs to the ﬁrm of being 
caught, because additional unlawful conduct raises the likelihood that a crime 
will be committed and the ﬁrm prosecuted. 
In other words, when managers feel immune from the threat of jail, TBTJ 
ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to induce their employees to commit crimes even 
when they expect the government may occasionally detect wrongdoing. By con-
trast, when prosecutorial strategy creates a credible threat of incarceration for the 
manager, then deterrence could be optimized beyond this TBTJ limit. However, 
if prosecutors rely solely on corporate ﬁnes, and culpable managers do not fear 
punishment, then crime can pay for TBTJ ﬁrms. 
 
118. This follows from equations (39) and (10). Infra Appendix A.3. 
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iv.  the too-big-to-jail  firm’s disincentive to cooperate 
Current DOJ strategy relies on ﬁrms to cooperate with government investi-
gations. But does this approach make economic sense when defendant ﬁrms are 
TBTJ? This Part argues that TBTJ ﬁrms lack incentives to cooperate in good 
faith with the government under certain conditions, and so existing strategies 
may fail to account for the concentration of TBTJ ﬁrms in today’s economy. The 
government seeks to induce good-faith cooperation by giving a carrot-and-stick 
structure to corporate criminal liability. As explained in Section III.D, under this 
law enforcement policy, a ﬁrm can disclose misconduct by its agents to prosecu-
tors in return for a discounted ﬁne, 𝑆ோ, which is less than what it would have 
paid had the government detected the wrongdoing itself, 𝑆௙. By adopting such a 
strategy, the government incentivizes the ﬁrm to invest in internal compliance, 
which can monitor managers’ activities and report misconduct. 
This strategy reﬂects current DOJ policy, which provides both formal leni-
ency programs for corporations that self-report wrongdoing and more general 
guidance on how corporate cooperation ought to affect charging decisions. Since 
1993, DOJ’s Antitrust Division has provided a criminal amnesty program for the 
ﬁrst corporation to self-report cartel activity; self-reporting under this regime 
permits the ﬁrst corporation in the door to avoid all criminal penalties for itself 
and its managers.
119
 DOJ’s Fraud Section launched a one-year pilot of a formal 
leniency program for ﬁrms that self-report bribery and corruption activities, of-
fering “up to a 50% reduction off the bottom end of the Sentencing Guidelines 
ﬁne range, if a ﬁne is sought.”
120
 The pilot was “intended to encourage compa-
nies to disclose FCPA misconduct to permit the prosecution of individuals whose 
criminal wrongdoing might otherwise never be uncovered by or disclosed to law 
enforcement.”
121
 This program was speciﬁcally aimed at increasing the effective-
ness of the Yates Memo’s incentives for corporate cooperation against culpable 
 
119. See Antitrust Div., Corporate Leniency Policy, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 10, 1993), https://www
.justice.gov/atr/ﬁle/810281/download [https://perma.cc/PY4A-NY25]. See generally Anti-
trust Div., Leniency Program, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.justice.gov
/atr/leniency-program [https://perma.cc/8FZP-Q3JM] (describing the terms and conditions 
of DOJ’s amnesty program). 
120. Criminal Div., The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. 8 (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/ﬁle/838386/download 
[https://perma.cc/K6VE-4J2L] [hereinafter FCPA Enforcement Plan]. The pilot program was 
replaced by a new FCPA corporate-enforcement strategy in November 2017. See Criminal Div., 
Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www
.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/ﬁle/937501/download [https://perma.cc/HP4X-95UY]. 
121. FCPA Enforcement Plan, supra note 120, at 9. 
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individuals, which aimed at increasing deterrence.
122
 Indeed, these leniency pro-
grams operate against the backdrop of the Justice Manual’s Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations, which have long counseled prosecutors 
to extend leniency to ﬁrms that cooperate in investigations of their agents, vol-
untarily disclose wrongdoing, and implement credible compliance programs.
123
 
Intuition derived from Becker’s economic analysis of crime might suggest 
that increasing corporate ﬁnes should always reduce the level of corporate crime 
and increase ﬁrms’ efforts to supervise managers. However, when a ﬁrm funds 
an internal-control mechanism that reports crimes to the government, there can 
be a “potentially perverse effect” where the expected cost of more frequent de-
tection and conviction outweighs the expected beneﬁt of self-reporting dis-
counts from the authorities and improved managerial incentives.
124
 
The model describes both investment in a corporate compliance program 
and in an internal investigation pursuant to government prosecution. In either 
case, the ﬁrm faces the decision whether to investigate and disclose any wrong-
doing by its agents. Doing so increases the likelihood of prosecution overall, be-
cause the ﬁrm will inform the government about some criminal conduct that the 
government would not have discovered on its own, but the internal controls may 




The ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in compliance programs is measured by the 
marginal beneﬁt from compliance-department funding 
𝛹 ൌ 𝜎𝑆௙ െ 𝑆ோ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜎ሻ൫𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ൯ െ ഐ்௉ሺ௡෤ሻ. (12)126 
If the marginal sanctions beneﬁt from compliance-department funding is posi-
tive, then it is economically rational for the ﬁrm to increase spending on internal 
controls. But if 𝛹 ൏ 0, then the ﬁrm has a perverse incentive: additional “invest-
ment” in compliance produces a negative return, since the costs of more frequent 
 
122. Id. at 2. 
123. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 8, § 9.28.300. 
124. See generally Arlen, supra note 88. 
125. The ﬁrm determines its compliance spending from equation (38), the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order con-
dition with respect to ρ. See infra Appendix A.3. The ﬁrst two terms are positive because in-
traﬁrm supervision improves the manager’s incentives, increasing productive effort and de-
creasing socially harmful effort, since 𝑛෤ఘ ൏ 0 by equation (34). The last term, 𝑇ఘ, represents 
the marginal cost to the ﬁrm of funding additional internal controls. See Garoupa, supra note 
64, at 249. 
126. This relation represents the return from investment in internal control, as described by the 
ﬁrst-order condition in equation (38). Equation (12) incorporates the term in the square 
brackets in equation (38), which represents the marginal savings in expected criminal penal-
ties and the marginal cost of internal control weighted by the probability of a crime occurring. 
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detection outweigh the beneﬁts of corporate responsibility. When 𝛹 ൌ 0 holds, 
both increasing penalties ⟨𝑆ோ, 𝑆௠, 𝜋⟩ and decreasing government investigative 
strength, as measured through the detection probability 𝜎, will cause the corpo-
ration to reduce spending on internal controls. This result is qualitatively differ-
ent from the standard certainty/severity trade-off entailed in Becker’s frame-
work, where the idea that probability of detection and severity of punishment 
are strategic substitutes extended to the problem of deterring the “corporate 
mind” from pursuing crime. That is, counterintuitively, at a certain point, in-
creasing corporate penalties may motivate the ﬁrm to act lawlessly rather than 
deter it from criminality as Becker’s standard trade-off suggests. 
There are two limit cases for corporate liability. First, consider when law en-
forcement policy does not include any corporate liability ሺ𝑆ோ ൌ 𝑆௙ ൌ 0ሻ. Insert-
ing this condition into equation (12) shows that 𝛹 will be negative, regardless of 
how prosecutors set their other policy parameters (investigative strength and 
criminal penalties for individuals).
127
 That is, in the absence of corporate liabil-
ity, the ﬁrm’s incentive is always perverse, so the ﬁrm never invests in compli-
ance, even if internal controls are more efficient than intrusive government in-
vestigations. Following the derivation in Appendix A.3, a corporate liability 
structure is optimal if 
𝜌𝑆ோ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎𝑆௙ ൌ 𝐻 െ ሾ𝜌 ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎ሿ𝑊ഥ . (13)128 
However, if there is no corporate liability and no threat of individuals facing jail 
time ሺ𝑆ோ ൌ 𝑆௙ ൌ 𝜋 ൌ 0ሻ, and so long as the crime is socially harmful ሺH ൐ ͞ሻ, 
equation (13) can never hold. Consequently, if policy makers want corporations 
to report employee malfeasance or to invest in costly structural reforms, corpo-
rate liability is required. 
The second limit is reached when corporate liability is maximal, so the TBTJ 
constraint fully binds: ⟨𝑆ோ ൌ 𝜉, 𝑆௙ ൌ 𝜉⟩. This occurs when a ﬁrm’s criminal ac-
tivity is so proﬁtable and so socially harmful that appropriate penalties run up 
against the TBTJ constraint—whether or not the ﬁrm cooperates. In other 
words, this condition holds when the appropriate ﬁne would imperil a TBTJ 
ﬁrm, even after the discount for cooperation credit. The BNP Paribas sanctions 
case is an example of this situation
129
: at the government’s behest, the bank spent 
millions of dollars on internal investigations over several years. Nevertheless, 
even with credit for cooperation, the ﬁne was still so large that ﬁnancial-stability 
pressures prevailed in reducing its punishment. At this upper limit of corporate 
liability 
 
127. That is, 𝛹 ൑ 0 ∀ ⟨𝜎, 𝑆௠, 𝜋⟩. 
128. This follows from equation (45) but for clarity ignores the social cost of intraﬁrm incentive 
distortion. 
129. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. 
prosecuting corporate crime when firms are too big to jail 
1401 
𝛹୘୆୘୎ ୫ୟ୶ ൌ െሺ1 െ 𝜎ሻ൫𝜉 ൅ 𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ൯ െ ഐ்௉ሺ௡෤ሻ. (14) 
Equation (14) shows that when the TBTJ constraint fully binds, 𝛹 will be neg-
ative for all possible values of the other enforcement parameters. Thus, a TBTJ 
ﬁrm will never have an incentive to invest in compliance or to self-report very 
proﬁtable (and very harmful) employee crimes. 
But the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in compliance begins to diminish under 
even weaker conditions. When the TBTJ constraint partially binds, which hap-
pens when the ﬁne incurred for government-detected criminality is maximal but 
the ﬁne for ﬁrm-reported wrongdoing is not, ൻ𝑆௙ ൌ 𝜉, 𝑆ோ ൏ 𝜉ൿ, the marginal re-
turn from internal-control investment is 
𝛹୘୆୘୎ ୮ୟ୰୲୧ୟ୪ ൌ 𝜎𝜉 െ 𝑆ோ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜎ሻ൫𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ൯ െ ഐ்௉ሺ௡෤ሻ. (15) 
While the ﬁrm’s returns from investing in the compliance department may still 
be positive for some portions of the remaining policy space, the incentive 
strength is decreasing in all remaining sanction parameters.
130
 That is, once the 
noncooperative ﬁne has reached its upper limit, tightening any of the other pen-
alties will induce the ﬁrm to cut back on internal controls. At the level of the ﬁrm 
as a whole, this represents another departure from Becker’s familiar prediction, 
because increasing the severity of punishment will not change the overall deter-
rence of corporate crime. 
Thus, the government will struggle to incentivize TBTJ companies to invest 
in meaningful and transparent internal-control mechanisms. If the government 
wants TBTJ companies to invest in corporate-crime prevention, it should man-
date investment by including structural-reform requirements and independent 
monitorships in settlement agreements. Like sectoral regulations, these man-
dates eschew reliance on general deterrence to create economic incentives for 
good corporate behavior and instead require that the company create adequate 
internal controls. 
Outside the context of an ongoing investigation, there are reasons to prefer 
a regime requiring corporate compliance to one wholly reliant on government 
investigation to discover criminal conduct. First, credible corporate compliance 
mechanisms conserve public resources. The intrusive investigations necessary to 
ferret out wrongdoing absent corporate cooperation would be very resource in-
tensive. And in the context of TBTJ ﬁrms, where ﬁnes cannot be raised above 
the TBTJ limit, the only way to achieve adequate deterrence would be to ratchet 
up the government’s investigative strength substantially. Thus, it is a more ef-
fective use of prosecutorial resources to exert pressure on ﬁrms sufficient to in-
 
130. 𝛹௜ ൏ 0 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ ሼ𝑆ோ, 𝑆௠, 𝜋ሽ. 
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duce their investment in internal controls. Second, internal compliance pro-
grams are likely more effective and efficient at discovering wrongdoing than gov-
ernment investigations. Companies’ internal investigators have broad access to 
corporate and employee information and can draw on privileged and conﬁden-
tial information about ﬁrm strategy and practices to understand managers’ ac-
tivities. Finally, absent credible internal controls within companies, the govern-
ment would have to engage in more intrusive and disruptive surveillance. 
Credible internal controls can help prevent and root out malfeasance without 
requiring the government to use dragnet tactics. 
Of course, these beneﬁts only accrue if the internal controls function as 
meaningful checks on corporate action, with the institutional position, inde-
pendence, and resources necessary to constrain a business’s proﬁt centers. 
Where a ﬁrm treats internal controls as box-ticking exercises and its compliance 
system as a business-prevention department to be circumvented, the govern-
ment should not rely on self-reporting to uncover wrongdoing. However, if 
managers anticipate that future criminal investigations will involve truly search-
ing and independent government investigation that could result in individual 
penalties, then they might be more willing to establish credible internal controls. 
Also, note that the ﬁrm’s decision-making parameter in this model is the 
level of cooperative internal control, , not the capital invested in that effort. 
Companies can, if they choose, spend money creating ineffective or uncoopera-
tive internal control programs. These programs could be either mere window 
dressing that fails to detect any wrongdoing or programs that cooperate in bad 
faith by withholding incriminating information unless confronted by the gov-
ernment with evidence of particular illegal conduct. Either way, spending on in-
ternal controls may fail to actually increase . This presents a challenge to pros-
ecutors, who can usually evaluate corporate cooperation only by proxy measures 
and through relationships of credibility and trust. However, this analysis sug-
gests that where ﬁrms are TBTJ, exposure for bad-faith “cooperation” may not 
credibly increase corporate criminal penalties. Prosecutors should thus avoid re-
lying on economic incentives and reputational concerns to elicit genuine coop-
eration. 
These ﬁndings have implications for corporate-crime-control policy in the 
era of TBTJ ﬁrms. Consider the case of ﬁnancial crime within the banking sector. 
Once banks have reached the size and level of interconnectedness where they are 
TBTF and the banking sector’s criminality produces large-scale social damage, 
increasing the severity of corporate and individual sanctions will not strengthen 
incentives for ﬁnancial institutions to increase internal controls that reveal 
wrongdoing to public authorities. If the TBTJ constraint binds sanctions for un-
reported criminal activity as in equation (15), the advice that emerges from a di-
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rect application of Becker’s standard certainty/severity trade-off—increase pen-
alties for ﬁrm-reported malfeasance and decrease costly public law enforce-
ment—does not hold for ﬁrm-level decision-making. Equation (14) suggests 
that policy where prosecutors impose maximal ﬁnes on cooperative corporations 
that report employee wrongdoing should not be expected to induce them to 
spend more to detect and turn over violators in their ranks. 
Put simply, when ﬁrms know that a prosecutor’s decision as to how much 
ﬁscal pain they can be made to suffer is constrained by their status as TBTJ in-
stitutions—whether or not they self-report their employees’ crimes—they expect 
to gain nothing by cooperation. Rational prosecutors should not, therefore, ex-
pect rational TBTJ companies to cooperate in good faith when it comes to inves-
tigating and reporting serious wrongdoing by employees. 
v. strategic implications for corporate criminal 
prosecution 
More than ever, law enforcement strategy relies on companies’ cooperation 
to deter corporate crime. The 2015 Yates Memo, DOJ’s latest amendment to the 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, relies on good-faith 
corporate cooperation, both before and after a government investigation com-
mences. This Note explains why, even if self-regulation is generally effective, re-
liance on corporate self-interest is misplaced when dealing with TBTJ ﬁrms. If 
the government is constrained in the possible sanctions it might employ, authen-
tic cooperation is economically irrational. Prosecutors therefore cannot assume 
that apparent cooperation is authentic. 
This conclusion has two key implications. First, prosecutors should use sub-
stantive mandates and independent monitors to ensure that corporate compli-
ance is more than window dressing. DOJ’s charging guidelines consider ade-
quacy of internal controls, so defendant companies have a strong incentive to 
trumpet investments in compliance programs.
131
 However, Garrett found that 
“[p]rosecutors appoint monitors quite unevenly,” while “[i]n contrast, judges in 
large corporate convictions commonly appoint monitors or special masters.”
132
 
An effective independent monitor can verify that a compliance program actually 
stops and reports criminal activity by corporate employees, even at the cost of 
 
131. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 8, § 9-28.300(A)(7) (explaining that prosecutors should con-
sider “the corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an effective cor-
porate compliance program or to improve an existing one” in deciding whether to bring 
charges). 
132. GARRETT, supra note 1, at 177-78. 




 Absent a monitor, prosecutors rely on the deterrent threat of further 
prosecution to induce a company to take structural and cultural reform seriously. 
But since a TBTJ ﬁrm may lack incentives to self-report crimes, prosecutors ne-
gotiating settlements should consider TBTJ status as an indication that an inde-
pendent monitor is warranted. 
Some commentators describe independent-monitor systems as incurious 
and captured, but this may be a consequence of bad institutional design creating 
poor incentives.
134
 Some scholars have argued that “prosecutors should not im-
pose structural reforms on nonindicted corporations,” because their inexperi-
ence in running businesses may impose excessive costs.
135
 Today, line prosecu-
tors maintain primary responsibility for supervising an internal monitor during 
a DPA’s pendency, and DOJ’s recent policy statement on the use of monitors 
intends to further decentralize supervision of monitors.
136
 But prosecutors 
rightly focus on building and trying cases, not supervising the details of corpo-
rate reform. Thus, this Note’s legislative proposal would improve the monitor-




The second strategic implication involves prosecutors’ mode of criminal in-
vestigation. Prosecutors often rely heavily on a corporate defendant’s internal 
investigation, usually conducted by outside counsel and sometimes with the as-
sistance of various professional-services ﬁrms.
138
 These engagements are now 
 
133. See, e.g., id. at 183-86 (describing the corporate monitor’s success and key role in institution-
alizing compliance reforms at Siemens A.G. following its settlement of FCPA violations). 
134. See Veronica Root, Constraining Monitors, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227, 2243 (2017); id. at 2229 
(arguing that the chief incentive governing monitorships is often the monitor’s self-interest 
in maintaining a good reputation, despite potential conﬂicts with disclosure, cronyist ap-
pointment processes, and limited systems for sanctioning misconduct). 
135. Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Im-
pose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REG-
ULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 62, 63 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011). 
136. See Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski Delivers Remarks at NYU School of Law Pro-
gram on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement Conference on Achieving Effective Compliance, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney 
-general-brian-benczkowski-delivers-remarks-nyu-school-law-program [https://perma.cc
/D8GJ-DCZV]. 
137. See infra Section VI.B.3. 
138. See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and “Good Corporate Citizen-
ship,” 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 979, 995-97 (2002). Outside counsel lead internal investigations, 
but professional-services ﬁrms, including the Big Four accountancy ﬁrms, often perform 
transaction analysis, document recovery, and forensic accounting. 
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big business in themselves, and they come with attendant revolving-door con-
cerns.
139
 The suspect company is usually responsible for the costs and hiring de-
cisions, though choice of investigators is subject to prosecutorial approval. In 
many cases, prosecutors end up entirely reliant on internal investigations for ac-
tivities such as the collection and production of relevant documents, identiﬁca-
tion of “hot” documents for further review, analysis of ﬁnancial and technical 
data, and employee interviews. Lawyers and their private investigators continu-
ally face difficult ethical questions about their dual roles as counsel to the de-
fendant and agent of the prosecutor because all inculpatory information dis-
closed may increase their clients’ liabilities.
140
 
This system creates numerous conﬂicts of interest, both for the client and 
the investigators. Clients have obvious incentives to appear cooperative while 
actually secreting away evidence of as-yet-undiscovered wrongdoing or other-
wise obstructing internal investigations. In a sprawling, multinational corpora-
tion, management may target an internal investigation narrowly to turn over 
only information about malfeasance of which the government is already aware 
but conceal information about other, related wrongdoing. Absent a whistle-
blower or a mistake, this strategy may never be revealed to the government. For 
a small company under investigation, any signiﬁcant resistance may trigger a 
more aggressive government response, such as indictment.
141
 But for a TBTJ 
corporation, there may be little additional downside to obstruction, since pros-
ecutors may not be able to increase punishments in any meaningful way. 
The case of the British bank Standard Chartered shows how subsequent dis-
covery of incomplete disclosure may not signiﬁcantly increase punitive sanc-
tions. After reaching a DPA in 2012 over sanctions-evasion charges, prosecutors 
reopened the case in 2014 to examine whether the bank’s internal investigation 
had failed to disclose the extent of its wrongdoing.
142
 The bank ultimately agreed 
 
139. See generally Andrew Longstreth, Double Agent, AM. LAW. (Feb. 1, 2005, 12:00 AM), https://
www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1106573737942 [https://perma.cc/64FZ-JXCR]. 
140. See Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the 
Employee Interview, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 865 (2003) (“Even sophisticated employees of-
ten fail to appreciate that corporate counsel may metamorphose into de facto government 
agents.”). 
141. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, A Tiny Bank’s Surreal Trip Through a Fraud Prosecution, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/business/a-tiny-banks-surreal 
-trip-through-a-fraud-prosecution.html [https://perma.cc/VE9U-VB3X] (describing the 
prosecution of Abacus Savings Bank). 
142. Chad Bray, Standard Chartered Agrees to 3-Year Extension of Nonprosecution Agreements, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2014, 4:53 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/10
/standard-chartered-extends-deferred-prosecution-agreements-for-3-years [https://perma
.cc/8SU7-R3L9]. 
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to a three-year extension of the settlement but paid no more.
143
 This treatment 
seems not to have deterred Standard Chartered from further illegality: in 2016, 
DOJ reportedly opened a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) investigation 
into bribery alleged to have happened in 2014 and 2015.
144
 
The ﬁrms that defendants hire to conduct internal investigations must also 
manage the conﬂicts of interest intrinsic to investigating and reporting on the 
client that pays the bills. Internal investigations are a lucrative business. The 
same set of professional-services ﬁrms repeatedly face off in pitches to potential 
internal-investigations clients, and defendant-friendly outcomes in past cases 
are crucial credentials. Yet during an investigation, attorneys, accountants, and 
consultants face decisions about how hard to push an investigative angle and 
what facts to disclose to the government. In the face of an uncooperative client 
or its stonewalling employees, an incurious investigator need not be dishonest 
to miss evidence of corporate guilt. Attorneys running internal investigations 
also have an ethical duty to abide by their clients’ lawful directions for a repre-
sentation’s objective;
145
 this permits a defendant company to curtail disclosure 
of inculpatory information. Thus, investigators continually face difficult deci-
sions when commitments to professional ethics and concerns about their repu-
tations with the government run headlong into their ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial incentives. 
The incentives problem is magniﬁed when a TBTJ defendant engages a 
TBTJ professional-services ﬁrm to investigate. In the event that obstruction is 
revealed, neither entity will likely be subject to the full strength of criminal sanc-
tion. Withholding inculpatory information is not a hypothetical concern: in 
2014, the New York Department of Financial Services ﬁned Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers $25 million for “improperly altering” a report at the behest of its client, 
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, which was under investigation for violations of 
U.S. economic sanctions.
146
 PricewaterhouseCoopers is one of the Big Four ac-






144. Ben Otto & Margot Patrick, Standard Chartered Faces U.S. Probe over Indonesian Investment, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2016, 5:30 AM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/standard-chartered 
-faces-u-s-probe-over-indonesian-investment-1474968604 [https://perma.cc/C7BB 
-R3RP]. 
145. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
146. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Bank of Tokyo Fined for ‘Misleading’ New York Regulator 
on Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014, 4:20 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/18
/lawsky-ﬁnes-bank-of-tokyo-mitsubishi-ufj-another-315-million [https://perma.cc/4RG7 
-F2FK]. 
147. See ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 43. 
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Conﬂicts of interest remain whenever prosecutors permit a defendant ﬁrm 
to demonstrate cooperation through compliance reforms or investigative assis-
tance, but risks of bad faith cooperation are heightened when the defendant is 
TBTJ. This Note’s model suggests that in the TBTJ context, prosecutors must 
credibly threaten incarceration for culpable individuals to effectively deter cor-
porate crime. DOJ has embraced this view in the 2015 Yates Memo, encouraging 
prosecutors to pursue individual convictions rather than just corporate settle-
ments. But this strategy is troubled to the extent that it relies on TBTJ companies 
to disclose individual wrongdoing. Particularly where such evidence would in-
crease an organization’s exposure to additional criminal or civil liability, it may 
be irrational for the ﬁrm to cooperate in good faith. 
vi.  reforming corporate settlement 
Corporate ﬁnes without individual accountability underdeter criminal con-
duct by and within TBTJ companies. But then why are so few corporate criminal 
settlements accompanied by indictments of culpable employees? This Part be-
gins by advancing a structural explanation for why relatively few individual pros-
ecutions emerge from large corporate criminal investigations: the federal courts’ 
inability to substantively review DPAs creates a dynamic vulnerable to tacit col-
lusion. Absent robust judicial scrutiny, prosecutors and TBTJ defendants may 
negotiate settlements that serve their own ﬁnancial, professional, and political 
ends but insufficiently protect the public interest, because they create only weak 
incentives to remediate corporate wrongdoing. I then introduce the DPA Proce-
dures Act,
148
 a legislative proposal that would reintroduce robust judicial review 
and meaningful criminal procedures into the DPA settlement process. This leg-
islation would address existing structural problems with DPA practice in two 
ways. First, it would provide defendants with an opportunity, short of a bet-the-
company criminal trial, to convince a court that the government’s theory of the 
case is either factually or legally deﬁcient. And second, the Act would require 
prosecutors to seriously investigate individual wrongdoing before obtaining the 
political beneﬁt of a headline-grabbing corporate settlement, thereby increasing 
the government’s incentive and ability to prosecute culpable individuals. 
 
148. See infra Appendix B. 
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A. Identifying the Source of the Problem 
1. The Law and Practice of Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
Prosecutions of large corporations only occasionally end in plea agreements 
and seldom go to trial. DPAs are the norm, even though they are subject to few 
statutory procedures or binding regulations. Instead, prosecutors negotiating 
DPAs operate under guidance memos issued by Deputy Attorneys General and 
supervision from senior DOJ officials. Over the years, this practice among repeat 
players has produced a set of conventions about the process and substance of 
DPAs. 
DPAs ﬁnd their statutory basis in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2), a provision of the 
Speedy Trial Act that excludes from the statutory clock “[a]ny period of delay 
during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pur-
suant to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, 
for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”
149
 
A joint motion for exclusion under § 3161(h)(2) generally includes the prosecu-
tor’s criminal information charging the defendant company, the defendant’s 
waiver of its right to indictment, a statement of facts outlining the basis for 
charges, and the operative agreement stating the DPA’s terms and penalties. 
When Congress enacted the DPA provision of the Speedy Trial Act in 1974, 
the ﬂoor debates discussed diversion of juvenile drug and prostitution offenders, 
not corporations. The practice of deferring prosecution had been invented in the 
1930s in the Eastern District of New York to avoid incarcerating young adults 
for nonviolent drug and prostitution offenses.
150
 By 1974, the “Brooklyn Plan” 
was widely used by prosecutors in New York City and Washington D.C.
151
 After 
codifying the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right, Congress had to provide this 
statutory exclusion for DPAs to remain feasible.
152
 
DPAs require court approval under § 3161(h)(2), and the legislative history 
reveals this was deliberate. Earlier bill drafts lacked the “with the approval of the 
 
149. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2018). 
150. Stephen J. Rackmill, Printzlien’s Legacy, the “Brooklyn Plan,” A.K.A. Deferred Prosecution, 60 
FED. PROB. 8, 9 (1996). 
151. ANTHONY PARTRIDGE, FED. JUD. CTR., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL 
ACT OF 1974, at 117 (1980). 
152. S. REP. NO. 36-37 (1974), as reprinted in PARTRIDGE, supra note 151, at 117. 
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court” clause and would have given the prosecuting U.S. Attorney complete dis-
cretion to set the DPA’s terms.
153
 In a 1971 Senate hearing, a former prosecutor 
argued that because a DPA “has some elements of a plea bargain . . . approval by 
the court on the record is a wise and necessary safeguard.”
154
 Congress agreed, 
requiring judicial supervision despite DOJ’s claim that court oversight would 
infringe on the separation of powers.
155
 
In two recent opinions, the D.C. and Second Circuits have reversed trial 
courts’ review of DPAs, declining to ﬁnd either inherent or statutory authority 
for any level of meaningfully intensive review.
156
 The Second Circuit’s decision 
emerged from the HSBC money-laundering case. While the DPA was pending 
and charges remained on the docket in the Eastern District of New York, Judge 
Gleeson granted a private citizen’s motion to unseal one of the reports ﬁled with 
the court by the independent monitor.
157
 Chief Judge Katzmann’s opinion ulti-
mately reversed the district court’s unsealing order because it concluded that the 
report was not a judicial document.
158
 But ﬁrst it inquired whether Judge 
Gleeson had properly invoked the district court’s supervisory authority in re-
quiring the monitor’s reports to be ﬁled with the court.
159 
The Second Circuit 
found that absent “clear evidence” of prosecutorial misconduct, the district 
court’s supervisory power did not authorize substantive review of a DPA’s terms, 
because prosecutors are entitled to both a presumption of regularity and the ex-
ercise of prosecutorial discretion.
160
 Chief Judge Katzmann also declined to con-
strue § 1361(h)(2) to authorize judicial review of a DPA’s substantive terms, 
“[a]t least in the absence of any clear indication that Congress intended courts 
to evaluate the substantive merits of a DPA or to supervise a DPA’s out-of-court 
implementation,” because Congress legislated “against the backdrop of long-
 
153. See Pretrial Crime Reduction Act of 1971, H.R. 7101, 92nd Cong. (as proposed in H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Apr. 1, 1971), as reprinted in PARTRIDGE, supra note 151, at 280-81. 
154. PARTRIDGE, supra note 151, at 116. 
155. See Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Hearings on S. 754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 207, H.R. 658, H.R. 687, H.R. 
773, and H.R. 4807 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 
2000 (1974) (exhibit to the testimony of W. Vincent Rakestraw, Assistant Att’y Gen.), as re-
printed in PARTRIDGE, supra note 151, at 117. 
156. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Fok-
ker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
157. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2016 WL 347670 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 
2016). 
158. HSBC Bank, 863 F.3d at 142. 
159. See id. at 133. 
160. Id. at 136-38. 
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The Second Circuit’s narrow construction of judicial authority echoes the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Fokker Services,
162
 which involved an 
aerospace company that violated U.S. economic sanctions. In Fokker, the district 
court refused to approve a proposed DPA, concluding that the defendant had 
been “prosecuted so anemically for engaging in such egregious conduct for such 
a sustained period of time” that it would “promote disrespect for the law.”
163
 The 
D.C. Circuit construed this refusal to turn on the government’s “fail[ure] to 
prosecute any ‘individuals . . . for their conduct.’”
164
 It then held that by refusing 
to grant the speedy-trial exclusion because it disagreed with the government’s 




Absent judicial review, the Justice Manual is the primary constraint on pros-
ecutors. In September 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates began an effort 
to refocus DOJ’s resources on individual prosecutions. Her memo stated that 
“[o]ne of the most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by seeking 
accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.”
166
 The 
memo required that “[t]o be eligible for any cooperation credit, corporations 
must provide to the Department all relevant facts about the individuals involved 
in corporate misconduct”
167
 and that “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, no 




Strong language notwithstanding, commentators have questioned the effi-
cacy of this policy statement.
169
 Just one week after the policy’s announcement, 
 
161. Id. at 138 (quoting Fokker Servs., 818 F.3d at 738). 
162. 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
163. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 167 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated and re-
manded, 818 F.3d 733. 
164. Fokker Servs., 818 F.3d at 740 (quoting Fokker Servs., 79 F. Supp. 3d at 166). 
165. Id. (“By rejecting the DPA based primarily on concerns about the prosecution’s charging 
choices, the district court exceeded its authority under the Speedy Trial Act.”). 
166. Yates Memo, supra note 17, at 1. 
167. Id. at 3. 
168. Id. at 5. 
169. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 60, 72 (2016) (“It is not altogether clear that it is in fact a new policy.”); Elizabeth 
E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on Prosecuting 
White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 59 (2015); Daniel P. Chung, Individual Account-
ability for Corporate Wrongdoing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 
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the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced a 
DPA with General Motors in a case involving defective ignition switches.
170
 No 
individuals were charged, despite various references in the settlement’s state-
ment of facts to speciﬁc individuals’ knowledge of the ignition switch defects.
171
 
This underscores that DOJ policy statements and internal procedures remain, 
ultimately, nonbinding guidance for prosecutors. Absent an applicable statute or 
a binding regulation, nothing prevents DOJ leadership from approving a weak 
settlement when it perceives that doing so would be politically expedient. 
2. Why Do Corporate Settlements Generate Relatively Few Individual 
Prosecutions? 
While recent years have seen some prosecutions of natural persons charged 
with white-collar crimes—such as those hedge-fund traders and corporate in-
siders prosecuted by the Southern District of New York for insider trading—few 
emerged from investigations of TBTF companies. Judge Jed Rakoff has argued 
that this record is historically anomalous and is troubling as matters of both 
strategy and justice.
172
 Since corporate criminal liability under federal law relies 
on respondeat superior, all corporate criminal charges must be premised on at 
least the possibility of an individual criminal charge for the same offense. So why 
have so few of the negotiated criminal settlements with TBTF ﬁrms been accom-
panied by prosecutions of culpable individuals? 
 
21, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/09/21/individual-accountability-for 
-corporate-wrongdoing [https://perma.cc/8QTN-3PZS]. 
170. U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Criminal Charges 
Against General Motors and Deferred Prosecution Agreement with $900 Million Forfeiture, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney 
-announces-criminal-charges-against-general-motors-and-deferred [https://perma.cc
/8VZK-3PAP]. 
171. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 27, United States v. Gen. Motors Co., No. 1:15-cv-
07342 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015), ECF No. 1-1, http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/ﬁle/772261
/download [https://perma.cc/Q7L8-R2EN]; see also Joh & Joo, supra note 169, at 53 (“In the 
GM case . . . the DOJ charged only the corporation with fraud and false statements to regula-
tors, even though the Information charging the corporation describes numerous acts by indi-
viduals that might have formed the basis for charges against them.”). 
172. See Rakoff, supra note 5 (“Just going after the company is . . . both technically and morally 
suspect. It is technically suspect because, under the law, you should not indict or threaten to 
indict a company unless you can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that some managerial agent 
of the company committed the alleged crime; and if you can prove that, why not indict the 
manager? And from a moral standpoint, punishing a company and its many innocent em-
ployees and shareholders for the crimes committed by some unprosecuted individuals seems 
contrary to elementary notions of moral responsibility.”). 
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DOJ officials maintain that they would have prosecuted culpable individuals 
if they could have made the case.
173
 Prosecutors may have lacked sufficient ad-
missible evidence to prove these individuals’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
some cases, culpable individuals may be outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 
And even when prosecutors can conceivably convict an individual, they might 
decline to indict for prudential reasons.
174
 For instance, prosecutors may deter-
mine that it would be unjust scapegoating to prosecute a low-level employee on 
whom they have sufficient evidence because other, more senior company officials 
are truly culpable but somehow insulated from prosecution. Alternatively, pros-
ecutors may decide that bringing an individual to trial is too expensive or too 
risky. 
These explanations aside, commentators have critiqued the government, ar-
guing that the dearth of individual cases reﬂects deeper injustices. On the one 
hand, representatives of big business have argued that relatively few culpable 
individuals are prosecuted because there were no crimes. Prosecutors wield such 
power over corporate defendants, they contend, that many settlements amount 
to extortion.
175
 A pending criminal investigation generates legal costs, manage-
rial distraction, and capital-market uncertainty sufficient to bring defendants to 
the negotiating table even before the government has presented deﬁnitive evi-
dence of criminal conduct. On this account, the shortfall in individual prosecu-
tions reﬂects the government’s inability to ﬁnd sufficient evidence to charge any 
 
173. See Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 269 (2014) (“At-
torney General Holder has avowed: ‘To the extent that we have the ability to bring cases 
against individuals or institutions, criminal charges, we will bring them.’ On the way out the 
door, former Criminal Division Chief Lanny Breuer shook off criticism for not throwing Wall 
Street executives behind bars and echoed: ‘If there had been a case to make, we would have 
brought it. I would have wanted nothing more, but it doesn’t work that way.’”). 
174. See id. (“[T]he breadth and depth of federal criminal law have led us to expect and demand 
that prosecutors exercise judgment in the massive discretionary space that Congress has ef-
fectively delegated to them.”). 
175. See, e.g., The Criminalisation of American Business, ECONOMIST (Aug. 28, 2014), https://www
.economist.com/leaders/2014/08/28/the-criminalisation-of-american-business [https://
perma.cc/GCX9-GJPF] (“[J]ustice should not be based on extortion behind closed doors. 
The increasing criminalisation of corporate behaviour in America is bad for the rule of law 
and for capitalism.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
28, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116468395737834160 [https://perma
.cc/3FZJ-57RQ] (“The agreements often read like the confessions of a Stalinist purge 
trial . . . .”); N. Richard Janis, Deputizing Company Counsel as Agents of the Federal Government, 
CATO INST. 4 (2008), https://object.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/janis_deputizing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VU33-UY6G] (“[A corporate settlement] can be, and often is, a state-
sponsored shakedown scheme in which corporations are extorted to pay penalties grossly out 
of proportion to any actual misconduct . . . . [P]ayment of tribute to the federal government 
[is] essentially a cost of doing business.”). 
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On the other hand, progressive critics have pointed to the revolving door 
between DOJ and the private sector to argue that business-friendly attorneys ex-
tend leniency to corporate criminals to curry favor with corporations and law 
ﬁrms they hope to join following their government service.
177
 Indeed, many fed-
eral prosecutors worked at corporate law ﬁrms prior to their government service, 
and many return to the private white-collar defense bar after leaving DOJ.
178
 
During the Obama administration, many DOJ leaders had spun through the re-
volving door already. Notably, Attorney General Eric Holder, Assistant Attorney 
General for the Criminal Division Lanny Breuer, and many of Mr. Breuer’s dep-
uties had come to the government from the law ﬁrm Covington & Burling and 
returned there immediately afterward.
179
 Critics have described a culture of def-
erence to corporate defendants, an unwillingness to accept the risks of taking 
complex white-collar cases to trial, and an eagerness to settle, even if that meant 
forgoing cases against individuals.
180
 
Even if DOJ leadership held this strategy, line prosecutors probably did not 
forego prosecution en masse to curry favor with future employers and clients. 
Compared to signing a settlement, prosecuting an executive at trial may be more 
prestigious experience for subsequent employment, particularly when high-
stakes trial experience is increasingly rare among litigators. Moreover, many at-
torneys choose to work as federal prosecutors, seeking the increasingly rare op-
portunity to try high proﬁle criminal cases. But careerism may push prosecutors 
to focus on obtaining large ﬁnes from corporate defendants rather than insisting 
on imposing structural-reform mandates or prosecuting individuals more ag-
gressively. As trials disappear, ﬁrms may value experience with the DPA process 
above courtroom skills.
181
 Personal risk aversion may push line prosecutors and 
 
176. See, e.g., JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO 
PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES, at xix-xxi (2017). 
177. See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate 
White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221, 1282 (2011). Some right-
wing critics sound a similar note. See, e.g., Justice Inaction: The Department of Justice’s Unprec-
edented Failure to Prosecute Big Finance, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY INST. 23, http://g-a-i.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2012/08/DOJ-Report-8-61.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2E5-CUMD] (“Why 
would a government attorney interested in returning to a lucrative ﬁeld throw his potential 
future clients in jail?”). 
178. See EISINGER, supra note 176, at 186-94; Weisselberg & Li, supra note 177, at 1282. 
179. See EISINGER, supra note 176, at 189-90. 
180. Id. at 197-98. 
181. Id. at 198. 
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their bosses to focus on the predictable path to a DPA instead of investing time 
and money to prepare for a trial that may take weeks or even months to conclude 
and will place the government opposite well-resourced individual defendants.
182
 
Finally, a corporate settlement cannot be reversed on appeal, unlike individual 
convictions after trial. 
These factors are consistent with the explanation that the government often 
proves unable to gather enough evidence to prosecute culpable individuals 
alongside corporations, but that does not suggest such evidence does not exist. 
Rather, the lack of evidence raises the question of whether the institutions used 
to investigate corporate crime and produce evidence usable for criminal trials are 
ﬁt for the purpose. As Daniel Richman has noted, “particularly in the white-
collar crime area . . . evidentiary strength is generally a function of prosecutorial 
effort, priorities, and institutional commitment.”
183
 Thus, the imbalance be-
tween corporate and individual prosecutions may reﬂect an inadequate investi-
gative apparatus. The availability of virtually unreviewable settlements provides 
the government and TBTJ defendants with a way to terminate an investigation 
on mutually beneﬁcial terms before uncovering sufficient evidence of individual 
guilt. 
The possibility of concluding corporate criminal investigations via negoti-
ated settlement exacerbates the TBTJ disincentive for genuine cooperation by 
lowering the amount of evidence required to successfully conclude a case. These 
resolutions may permit a form of tacit collusion
184
 between headline-hungry 
prosecutors and executives eager to move on. Prosecutors may uncover evidence 
of wrongdoing but not know who speciﬁcally made key decisions, since respon-
sibilities may be shared, records missing, and memories fuzzy. Corporate crimi-
nal liability may lie, even if there is no evidence to support charges against any 
particular individual, because “it may not matter under the law which of several 
possible executives or leaders in a chain of command approved of or authorized 
criminal conduct.”
185
 And since the settlements are never litigated, neither evi-
dence nor charging theories are tested in court. But from the perspective of pub-
 
182. Id. 
183. Richman, supra note 173, at 269. 
184. I am using the term “tacit collusion” in its microeconomics sense to refer to a situation where 
two parties, acting independently, ﬁnd it individually rational to adopt the same strategies 
that they would if they were to actually collude. That is, rather than competing, the parties 
act in manner that is mutually beneﬁcial but does not maximize social welfare. 
185. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. 
Att’ys 7 (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/opa/legacy/2008/08/28
/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7UJ-P3J4]. 
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lic-choice theory, these settlements are valuable. Federal prosecutors, DOJ lead-
ership, and the President can generate political capital from astronomical ﬁnes, 
and they may fulﬁll a mandate to crack down on corporate crime. Settlements 
also provide cash windfalls for elected prosecutors to dispense unilaterally
186
 or 
opportunities to generate political chits.
187
 
Corporate defendants also beneﬁt from settlement. A settlement prevents 
further investigation of the company’s affairs, which could expand both the cor-
poration’s and its executives’ liability. A settlement also permits the company to 
negotiate over the public disclosure of information concerning its malfeasance. 
A defendant might agree to pay a higher ﬁne to avoid making deﬁnitive admis-
sions of guilt, disclosing the content of inculpatory communications, or reveal-
ing the identities of culpable executives. Such secrecy can also protect against 
civil liability, whether from shareholders, consumers, or crime victims. 
If a defendant company (or its executives) has an incentive to obstruct gov-
ernment investigators—as TBTJ ﬁrms may—then the government’s reliance on 
internal investigations may be exploited. Investigative ﬁrms may also adopt in-
curious postures where illegality is not immediately apparent, so as to increase 
their attractiveness to other corporations for future investigative work. This 
structural explanation does not require unethical lawyering. It is enough that 
culpable managers at a defendant ﬁrm successfully dissemble to corporate de-
fense counsel, as some have been found to do.
188
 
Defense counsel cannot investigate using the same tools as government 
agents. Prosecutors investigating a criminal conspiracy use leverage to extract 
information from subordinates and interview witnesses separately to create pris-
oners’ dilemmas. But in the routine corporate-crime investigation, defense 
counsel conducts both the internal investigation and the defense effort, often or-
ganizing a joint defense agreement with individual employees.
189
 Thus, prior to 
 
186. See, e.g., James C. McKinley Jr., Cyrus Vance Has $808 Million to Give Away, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/08/nyregion/cyrus-vance-has-dollar-808 
-million-to-give-away.html [https://perma.cc/7ECM-Z4MM]. 
187. See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, In Testy Exchange in Congress, Christie Defends His Record as a 
Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/nyregion
/26christie.html [https://perma.cc/7N4G-Z9MA] (describing Chris Christie’s conferral of a 
lucrative monitorship on John Ashcroft’s ﬁrm). 
188. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Case Expands Type of Lies Prosecutors Will Pursue, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 
2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/17/business/case-expands-type-of-lies 
-prosecutors-will-pursue.html [https://perma.cc/755E-TM3Z] (describing guilty pleas to 
obstruction-of-justice charges entered by executives of Computer Associates for lying to at-
torneys with Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, which was conducting an internal investigation 
of the company). 
189. See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 8, § 9-28.730. 
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meeting with prosecutors, employees likely know how other relevant employees 
have answered hard questions. Conspiracies are far more robust under condi-
tions permitting coordination. Prosecutors are also more reluctant to use pow-
erful investigative tools such as wiretaps, undercover recordings, or grand jury 
testimony in corporate-crime cases, compared to investigations of other types of 
complex conspiracies.
190
 We may thus see prosecutors’ reluctance to use the in-
vestigative tactics normally employed to unravel criminal conspiracies as the 
most troublesome form of deference to corporate-crime defendants, because it 
insulates both individuals and institutions from responsibility for wrongdoing. 
If there is a revolving-door problem, it is excessive deference to the internal-
investigation process, not a reluctance to charge individuals against whom there 
is ample evidence. Prosecutors might be eager to indict an executive if they had 
sufficient evidence, but acculturation to the internal-investigations business 
breeds attorneys who are familiar with its customs and respectful of its work 
product. Absent resources to independently investigate, prosecutors welcome an 
internal investigation’s ﬁndings. Prepackaged conclusions inculpating the cor-
poration may be enough to satisfy some prosecutors, even if the internal inves-
tigations would not support charges against any individuals. 
B. A Proposal for Reform 
The Constitution exclusively vests prosecutorial discretion in the executive 
branch. But Congress can improve corporate-crime control by shifting the stat-
utory framework within which prosecutors operate by introducing action-forc-
ing procedures. Provided the statutory authority, federal courts could supervise 
prosecutors more closely and ensure that negotiated settlements serve the public 
interest. Finally, transparency requirements can enlist the press in maintaining 
accountability for corporate criminal prosecutions and companies’ structural re-
forms. 
This Section presents a legislative proposal that would introduce binding 
procedural requirements on DOJ’s use of DPAs to resolve corporate criminal in-
vestigations. DPAs have shifted from an exceptional pretrial diversion tool to the 
norm. Thus, the DPA Procedures Act would authorize more searching judicial 
review of DPAs, ban unreviewable nonprosecution agreements, structure pros-
ecutorial decision-making, mandate transparency, and create a new office within 
DOJ to develop expertise in structural reforms. Some provisions add procedural 
protections for defendant ﬁrms. Others are intended to be action-forcing re-
quirements to push prosecutors to improve investigative strategy. And others are 
intended to increase political accountability of the government’s crime control 
 
190. See EISINGER, supra note 176. 
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strategies. The full text of this model bill is presented in Appendix B. The fol-
lowing Sections explain the operation of and rationale for the bill’s key provi-
sions. 
1. Strengthening Judicial Review of Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
The current legal framework for DPAs provides defendants with few en-
forceable rights and requires minimal transparency from DOJ. As Section VI.A.1 
explained, the D.C. and Second Circuits have declined to read § 1361(h)(2) of 
the Speedy Trial Act as authorizing any meaningful judicial review of a corporate 
DPA’s substance.
191
 Since both the TBTJ dynamic and the DPA’s role are well 
established, Congress should put corporate DPAs on a sounder statutory foot-
ing. Several judges have already called for Congress to authorize judicial review 
of corporate DPAs.
192
 The legislative proposal laid out in Appendix B would es-
tablish a robust framework for judicial review of corporate DPAs. It aims both 
to protect defendants from inadequate prosecutions and to induce prosecutors 
to reach settlements that would better prevent corporate crime. 
The DPA Procedures Act would establish a mandatory process for judicial 
approval of DPAs where the defendant is an organization.
193
 It requires that 
prosecutors publicly ﬁle all DPAs with a competent district court and include in 
that ﬁling a charging document articulating the theory of liability, a statement of 
facts to support those charges, a written agreement stating all penalties and re-
form mandates, and a statement from the prosecutor explaining why she decided 
to resolve the case with a DPA and how the proposed agreement serves the public 
interest.
194
 The Act would authorize the court to make a two-pronged inquiry: 
ﬁrst, whether the charging document and statement of facts sufficiently state a 
 
191. See supra Section IV.A.1; see also United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 138 (2d 
Cir. 2017) (declining to “interpret that provision’s vague ‘approval’ requirement as imbuing 
courts with an ongoing oversight power over the government’s entry into or implementation 
of a DPA”); United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (ﬁnding 
that “the Act confers no authority in a court to withhold exclusion of time pursuant to a DPA 
based on concerns that the government should bring different charges or should charge dif-
ferent defendants”). 
192. See HSBC Bank, 863 F.3d at 143 (Pooler, J., concurring) (“I respectfully suggest it is time for 
Congress to consider implementing legislation providing for such review.”); United States v. 
Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 30 n.9 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[C]ongressional action to clarify 
the standards a court should apply when confronted with a corporate deferred-prosecution 
agreement may be appropriate.”). 
193. See infra Appendix B, Deferred Prosecution Agreement Procedures Act § 1(a); see also id. 
§ 1(b)(1) (deﬁning “Defendant” to restrict the Act’s application to business organizations). 
194. Id. § 1(d) (“Form of Agreement”). 
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theory of corporate criminal liability; and second, whether approval serves the 
public interest.
195
 In determining whether to approve the agreement, the court 
would be empowered to conduct some limited fact-ﬁnding, and the defendant 
would be able to challenge weaknesses in the government’s theory of the case, 
requiring the government to put forward sufficient evidence to support its 
claims.
196
 Finally, if the government alleged that the defendant had breached its 
obligations, the court would supervise the agreement’s termination.
197
 
Judicial review should induce prosecutors to amass sufficient evidence to 
prosecute culpable individuals alongside corporations. The Act would require 
the court to ensure that the DPA set forth a charging theory with sufficient legal 
and factual support to satisfy a motion-to-dismiss inquiry.
198
 Since a sufficient 
corporate charge would require a plausible respondeat superior theory, these 
procedures would ensure prosecutors identify at least one culpable individual 
prior to achieving the political beneﬁt of a corporate prosecution. And since the 
Act empowers defendants to compel the government to adduce factual sup-
port,
199
 prosecutors would have to accrue some evidence of malfeasance by re-
sponsible individuals. The Act leaves courts to deﬁne the public-interest inquiry 
through federal common law. Garrett has explained how a court might do so by 
considering ten factors: adequacy of ﬁnancial penalties, imposition of compli-
ance terms, monitoring, cooperation with law enforcement, substantive law, col-
lateral consequences, harm caused to victims and the public, government inter-
ests, delay, and informing the public.
200
 Whether courts should adopt all of these 
factors is beyond the scope of this Note, but suffice it to say that courts have the 
capability and tools to conduct the Act’s public-interest inquiry. 
 
195. Id. § 1(e) (“Judicial Approval”). 
196. Id. § 1(f) (“Procedure for Judicial Approval”). 
197. Id. § 1(j) (“Terminating the Agreement”). 
198. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v) permits a defendant to move for dismissal 
of a criminal indictment for failure to state an offense, but courts have employed a lenient 
standard in reviewing an indictment’s sufficiency. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 
117-18 (1974). While the Act does not propose a precise legal test for a DPA’s sufficiency, the 
procedures would only achieve their purposes if district courts applied a more rigorous review, 
akin to the plausibility test used in the civil motion-to-dismiss context. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); cf. James M. Burnham, Why Don’t Courts Dismiss Indictments?: 
A Simple Suggestion for Making Federal Criminal Law a Little Less Lawless, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 347, 
357-58 (2015) (arguing for the application of the civil plausibility test in the criminal context). 
199. For a more detailed description of the factual-support requirements, see infra Appendix B, 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement Procedures Act § 1(f)(2) (“Procedure for Judicial Ap-
proval”). 
200. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1525-
36 (2017). 
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Bearing this burden, prosecutors should be less willing to rely solely on in-
vestigations that ﬁnd general corporate wrongdoing without identifying spe-
ciﬁc, culpable individuals. The prospect of judicial review should encourage 
prosecutors both to exert continuous pressure on internal investigations prior to 
extending cooperation credit and to conduct more genuine, independent inves-
tigations themselves. Prosecutors could still satisfy the judicial-review procedure 
with evidence far short of that required to bring a complex white-collar criminal 
case to trial and win before a jury. But the Act would forestall political victory 
until there is at least some evidence of individual wrongdoing. The idea is to put 
DOJ attorneys in a better position to prosecute individuals at the point where a 
corporate settlement is possible. 
This approach activates the judiciary’s oversight capacity without violating 
the separation-of-powers concerns aired by the HSBC and Fokker Services courts. 
Both HSBC and Fokker Services turned on statutory holdings, which found that 
Congress had not clearly authorized substantive judicial review of corporate 
DPAs in the Speedy Trial Act. Under the approach taken in the DPA Procedures 
Act, the judiciary would be unable to compel prosecutors to ﬁle charges. Thus, 
it avoids the separation-of-powers limit that the Fokker Services court identi-
ﬁed.
201
 To the contrary, separation-of-powers concerns support adding proce-
dures: by relying on DPAs in corporate criminal prosecutions, the executive has 
arrogated a power that combines elements of criminal and regulatory authority, 
then claimed it as unreviewable. John C. Coffee described prosecutors as having 
“something close to absolute power” when negotiating corporate criminal set-
tlements.
202
 It would render the judiciary a rubber stamp to say, as a matter of 
constitutional law, that Congress may permit the executive to obtain judicial im-
primatur for its preferred resolution of a criminal case but may not mandate ju-
dicial review of the charges’ legal and factual sufficiency. 
Courts have been called on to prevent collusive settlements in other circum-
stances. At the same time that Congress was working on the Speedy Trial Act, it 
was also considering the problem of collusive settlements between the DOJ An-
titrust Division and politically powerful businesses. The resulting Tunney Act is 
still in force today. It requires that courts considering an antitrust consent decree 
determine whether “the entry of such judgment is in the public interest.”
203
 In 
requiring the court to make an independent public-interest appraisal of antitrust 
 
201. See United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
202. John C. Coffee, Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has It Gone Too Far?, NAT’L L.J., July 25, 2005, at 13, 
13. 
203. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (2018); see also Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
528, § 2, 88 Stat. 1706, 1707 (1974) (codiﬁed as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2018)) (enacting 
the public-interest requirement of § 16). 
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consent decrees, Congress was concerned that settlement terms were inappro-
priately affected by lobbying and political considerations since most defendants 
in antitrust cases are large, politically powerful corporations.
204
 Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 also seeks to prevent binding absent class members with a 
collusive settlement through an independent judicial appraisal of fairness, rea-
sonableness, and adequacy.
205
 And when the U.K. Parliament decided to intro-
duce corporate DPAs by statute, it required that courts conduct two separate 




At least one bill that would have expressly authorized judicial review has al-
ready died in committee.
207
 The Accountability for Deferred Prosecution Act of 
2014 would have required the Attorney General to issue “written guidelines” for 
the Department’s use of DPAs and provided that a reviewing court “shall ap-
prove the agreement if the court determines the agreement is consistent with the 
guidelines for such agreements and is in the interests of justice.”
208
 In essence, 
this Act would have permitted DOJ to establish its own rules for DPAs while 
giving courts the power to police prosecutorial compliance with the rules. How-
ever, this Act would not have clearly authorized courts to inquire into whether a 
proposed agreement would serve the public interest or whether the charging 
document and statement of facts sufficiently supported a theory of corporate 
criminal liability. 
In contrast, my proposed model legislation would require prosecutors to ﬁle 
a public-interest statement, which courts could take into account. This public-
interest statement, modeled on the Tunney Act’s competitive-impact-statement 
provision,
209
 would focus the court’s inquiry, maintain the executive’s primacy 
by providing an explanation subject to judicial deference, and inform the public 
why each settlement is structured as it is. As in the antitrust context, the state-
ment’s preparation itself has beneﬁts for the public interest, because a mandate 
to publicly justify a settlement’s provisions will focus government negotiators 
 
204. See Lawrence M. Frankel, Rethinking the Tunney Act: A Model for Judicial Review of Antitrust 
Consent Decrees, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 549, 552 (2008); see also John J. Flynn & Darren Bush, The 
Misuse and Abuse of the Tunney Act: The Adverse Consequences of the “Microsoft Fallacies,” 34 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 749, 755-57 (2003) (describing the appearance of corruption in the Nixon DOJ’s 
consent decree with International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.). 
205. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
206. Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, § 45, sch. 17.7(1)(b), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga
/2013/22/enacted [https://perma.cc/HB72-UB8R]. 
207. See Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2014, H.R. 4540, 113th Cong. (2014). 
208. Id. §§ 4(a), 7(a). 
209. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2018). 
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on ensuring that the DPA remediates the root causes of the particular unlawful 
conduct and deters future criminality within the organization. 
While DOJ would certainly oppose these constraints, the Act is designed to 
solicit support from the business lobby. Defendants have long argued that DPAs 
permit DOJ to extort companies without viable legal theories or sufficient factual 
proof of wrongdoing.
210
 The Act would provide companies with a means of de-
fending themselves in court from DPAs that lack a sufficient legal and factual 
underpinning.
211
 By precluding other prosecutions, the Act would also address 
the problem that negotiated settlement agreements can leave defendant ﬁrms 
liable to prosecution in other jurisdictions, including by other actors within 
DOJ.
212
 It would also provide defendants with judicial protection from a DPA’s 
termination.
213
 Finally, companies subject to DPAs would have recourse to the 
court to enforce regulations regarding the conduct of any independent monitors, 




210. See, e.g., Paul Larkin, The Problematic Use of Nonprosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
to Beneﬁt Third Parties, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/report
/the-problematic-use-nonprosecution-and-deferred-prosecution-agreements-beneﬁt-third 
-parties [https://perma.cc/H7PR-G7TZ]. 
211. See infra Appendix B, Deferred Prosecution Agreement Procedures Act § 1(e) (“Judicial Ap-
proval”).  
212. See id. § 1(g) (“Effect of Agreement”); cf. Materials on Nonprosecution Agreement Between 
the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, the Eastern District of New 
York, and JPMorgan Securities (Asia Paciﬁc) Ltd. 6, https://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett 
/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/jpmorgan-securities-asia-paciﬁc.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3FJ5-CKTB] (“This Agreement is binding on the Company, JPMC, and the Offices 
but speciﬁcally does not bind any other component of the Department of Justice, [or] other 
federal agencies . . . .”). But see JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 8, § 1-12.100 (emphasizing that, 
in investigations involving multiple DOJ components, DOJ attorneys “should remain mindful 
of their ethical obligation not to use criminal enforcement authority unfairly to extract, or to 
attempt to extract, additional civil or administrative monetary payments”). 
213. See infra Appendix B, Deferred Prosecution Agreement Procedures Act § 1(j) (“Terminating 
the Agreement”); cf. Materials on Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the Office the 
Southern District of New York and General Motors Co. 11, https://lib.law.virginia.edu 
/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/gm.pdf [https://perma.cc/A35Y-7PJR] 
(giving the U.S. Attorney’s Office “sole discretion” to rescind the DPA upon determining a 
violation occurred).  
214. See infra Appendix B, Deferred Prosecution Agreement Procedures Act § 1(h) (“Conduct of 
Monitors”). 
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2. Prohibiting Corporate Nonprosecution Agreements 
Effective judicial review requires that Congress prohibit prosecutors from 
entering into nonprosecution agreements (NPAs) and other forms of negotiated 
settlement that bypass the courts and “escape judicial review entirely.”
215
 So long 
as prosecutors can freely choose to obtain the beneﬁts of a DPA without any re-
view, courts will struggle to develop a robust supervisory jurisprudence.
216
 For 
that reason, functional alternatives to DPAs must be prohibited. 
NPAs are contracts between a particular prosecutor and a defendant corpo-
ration that formalize the prosecutor’s decision not to bring charges in exchange 
for a ﬁnancial penalty and other terms. “[F]ormal charges are not ﬁled and the 
agreement is maintained by the parties rather than being ﬁled with a court.”
217
 
Judicial approval is not involved; prosecutors just issue a press release, an NPA 
letter, and a statement of facts.
218
 NPAs are widely viewed as less punitive than 
DPAs, and the lack of criminal charges “giv[es] a small public relations beneﬁt 
to the company, which can truthfully assert it was never prosecuted for the mis-
conduct.”
219
 Also unlike DPAs, NPAs lack any statutory basis: DOJ relies on its 
inherent authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion. 
Prosecutors are still ﬁnding new applications for unreviewable NPAs. In 
April 2016, the DOJ Criminal Division announced the FCPA pilot program, un-
der which ﬁrms that self-reported unlawful payments and cooperated with the 
government could qualify for a process described as “declinations with disgorge-
ment,” in which the Department declines to bring charges and the company dis-
gorges associated proﬁts.
220
 This “presumption that the [self-reporting and co-
operating] company will receive a declination absent aggravating circumstances” 
 
215. Garrett, supra note 200, at 1511.  
216. See Gordon Bourjaily, Note, DPA DOA: How and Why Congress Should Bar the Use of Deferred 
and Non-Prosecution Agreements in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 543, 
565-66 (2015). 
217. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Compo-
nents, U.S. Att’ys 1 n.2 (Mar. 7, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/dag 
/legacy/2008/03/20/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KT7 
-6WBX]. 
218. See, e.g., Materials on Nonprosecution Agreement Between the Southern District of New York 
and Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 43. 
219. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 1, 2013) (quoting Peter J. Henning, The Organizational Guidelines: R.I.P.?, 116 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 312, 314 n.9 (2007)). 
220. Karen Woody, “Declinations with Disgorgement” in FCPA Enforcement, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
269, 270-71 (2018); see Andrew Weissmann, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enforcement Plan and Guidance, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T JUST. (2016), https://www.justice
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has subsequently been formalized in the Justice Manual.
221
 The pilot program’s 
goals were to “deter individuals and companies from engaging in FCPA viola-
tions in the ﬁrst place, encourage companies to implement strong anti-corrup-
tion compliance programs to prevent and detect FCPA violations, and . . . in-
crease the Fraud Section’s ability to prosecute individual wrongdoers whose 
conduct might otherwise have gone undiscovered or been impossible to 
prove.”
222
 The ﬁrst two companies to obtain declinations with disgorgement re-
ceived them via NPAs.
223
 
Prohibiting DOJ from entering into NPAs requires legislation. To avoid pro-
hibiting other forms of declinations, the ban should target the core issue: decli-
nations issued to business organizations in exchange for money. Section 2 of the 
DPA Procedures Act would ban corporate NPAs while maintaining DOJ’s au-
thority to enter court-supervised DPAs, issue no-action letters, and publish 
guidance in the form of advisory opinions or nonenforcement policies.
224
 The 
Act does not pose separation-of-powers concerns because prosecutors retain the 
unreviewable discretion to decline to charge any defendant. Nor would the stat-
ute dictate when prosecutors should bring charges or what factors they should 
consider.
225
 This statute would regulate prosecutors’ exercise of that discretion, 
prohibiting them from using a species of private contract to obtain large pay-
ments as consideration for declining prosecution.
226
 It would recognize that 
NPAs have become an important means of imposing criminal sanctions beyond 
any judicial supervision. Compelling prosecutors to submit negotiated corporate 
criminal settlements to a court thus reintroduces a separation of powers into this 
area of criminal practice. 
 
.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/ﬁle/838386/download [https://perma.cc/66VV-M4JT]; see 
also supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
221. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 8, § 9-47.120. 
222. Weissmann, supra note 220, at 2. 
223. These companies were Nortek Inc. and Akamai Technologies. See SEC Announces Two Non-
Prosecution Agreements in FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 7, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-109.html [https://perma.cc/U3TK-272X]. 
224. The statutory language is modeled on a proposal in a student note in the Harvard Journal on 
Legislation. See Bourjaily, supra note 216, at 566 (proposing a similar statute to prohibit NPAs). 
225. See id. 
226. Id. 
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3. Improving Structural-Reform Mandates and Increasing Political 
Accountability for Law Enforcement Strategy 
“Structural-reform prosecutions” use the leverage achieved from charging an 
entire organization to compel adoption of substantial internal reforms.
227
 A com-
mon critique of structural-reform prosecutions is that prosecutors do not know 
how to run a business or rebuild failing internal controls. Federal prosecutors 
usually do lack such expertise. Moreover, prosecutors employ structural-reform 
mandates in an ad hoc manner, since “DOJ . . . has not adopted genuine stand-
ards governing what mandates to impose.”
228
 This, along with the lack of judi-
cial oversight, has led some commentators to argue that structural-reform pros-
ecutions operate in ways that are “inconsistent with the rule of law.”
229
 Others 
believe that the efficacy of such mandates is an open question.
230
 This Note 
shows why ﬁnes alone may not incentivize TBTJ companies to restructure prof-
itable businesses.
231
 Once a company has demonstrated disrespect for the law, it 
is sensible to subject it to more intrusive supervision than law-abiding competi-
tors face under generally applicable law, particularly where ﬁnes alone may not 
induce sufficient internal policing. The DPA Procedures Act would encourage 
structural reforms by making them more rigorous, fair, and transparent. 
Currently, DOJ attorneys lead prosecutions, handle settlement negotiations, 
and maintain ongoing responsibility pending DPAs. They implement and su-
pervise structural-reform mandates without supervision from the courts.
232
 This 
decentralization stymies institutional learning by doing. Anecdotal evidence also 
suggests that, in practice, line prosecutors spend little time and effort monitoring 
DPA implementation because they are focused on building new cases. 
The Act would create a DOJ Office of Corporate Reform to centralize design 
and administration of structural reforms.
233
 This Office would consult with 
 
227. See Garrett, supra note 18, at 855. 
228. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 73, at 327. 
229. Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through De-
ferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 192 (2016). 
230. See Garrett, supra note 18. 
231. See supra Section VI.A.1. 
232. See Garrett, supra note 18, at 933-34 (“Where courts do not narrow the meaning of [broad, ill-
deﬁned] statutes, prosecutors ﬁx their meaning in practice, so that in effect the legislature has 
delegated common-law crime-making authority to prosecutors.”). 
233. See infra Appendix B, Deferred Prosecution Agreement Procedures Act § 1(i)(1). 
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prosecutors during DPA negotiations and monitor subsequent implementa-
tion.
234
 Centralizing responsibility would permit the Office’s dedicated team of 
attorneys and compliance professionals to gain experience in designing and im-
plementing structural-reform programs tailored to the speciﬁc industries and 
crimes that are repeat subjects of DPAs. It echoes a limited effort undertaken by 
the Fraud Section in 2015, when it hired a compliance expert.
235
 Because the Of-
ﬁce would have the discretion to ﬁnd a company in breach of its DPA obligations, 
the Office is properly located in DOJ rather than in a sectoral regulator. However, 
the statute would require the Office to collaborate with sectoral regulators in de-
veloping and supervising structural reforms, since these regulators have more 
experience with defendants and the needs of regulated industry.
236
 Simultan-
eously, the Act expands due process by requiring DOJ to issue regulations gov-
erning monitors’ conduct and costs and by requiring courts to supervise moni-
tors and hear ﬁrms’ objections.
237
 
Centralizing structural reforms could make corporate prosecution a more ef-
fective steward of the public interest when several companies are prosecuted for 
similar crimes. For instance, from 2010 to 2017, at least thirty global banks were 
penalized for assisting customers who were subject to U.S. economic sanctions 
to move money illegally.
238
 Had a centralized unit designed and overseen com-
pliance reforms, it could have gained meaningful experience in repairing broken 
internal controls. Yet these cases were likely handled by many different prosecu-
tors in numerous U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and Main Justice. Certainly, these cases 
received coordinated attention at the highest levels of the Department,
239
 but 
that does not necessarily mean that lessons were being learned, shared, and sys-
tematically employed across cases or across offices. And what little is publicly 
known about the banks’ implementation of reforms is troubling, in that it reveals 
substantial resistance within ﬁrms subject to DPAs. For instance, in 2015, 
HSBC’s independent monitor, installed pursuant to the 2012 money-laundering 
and sanctions-evasion DPA, reported that his interactions with senior managers 
 
234. See id. § 1(i). 
235. See New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud Section, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 
3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/ﬁle/790236/download [https://perma.cc
/E6FJ-EQMQ]. 
236. See infra Appendix B, Deferred Prosecution Agreement Procedures Act § 1(i)(4). 
237. See id. § 1(h). 
238. See Fines for Banks That Breached U.S. OFAC Sanctions, THOMSON REUTERS (2017), 
https://www.reﬁnitiv.com/content/dam/gl/en/documents/infographics/ﬁnes-for-banks 
-that-breached-us-sanctions-infographic.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP3T-HWN5]. 
239. See EISINGER, supra note 176 (describing prosecutors’ frustration with the degree of manage-
rial control from political appointees). 
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were “marked by combativeness,” as the managers “inappropriately pushed back 
against adverse ﬁndings” by the auditors and “resisted” in a way that “demon-
strated a deﬁcient culture that had not fully accepted the role and legitimacy of 
. . . [a]udit and control functions.”
240
 
Transparency could also enhance accountability for DOJ’s corporate-crime 
agenda. The Act would make public access to independent monitors’ reports a 
default DPA term.
241
 Currently, the public knows relatively little about reforms 
in companies subject to multiple rounds of investigation and settlement. But 
corporate conduct and government are matters of intense public concern. Struc-
tural reforms are generally conﬁdential, and DOJ has not publicly reviewed 
whether its agreements have effectively reformed defendant institutions.
242
 
While prosecutors trumpet settlements in press releases, they often fail to dis-
close the operative legal text of settlements to the public. One study found that 
from 2012 to 2014, less than thirty-ﬁve percent of DOJ’s press releases announc-
ing corporate settlements provided access to the underlying legal documents,
243
 
and the best publicly accessible database of corporate criminal settlements is op-
erated by the University of Virginia Law Library, not the government.
244
 Even 
summarized or redacted versions of monitors’ reports would assist the press in 
holding companies and prosecutors to account for their responses to corporate 
crime. Greater access to the text of settlements would also allow researchers to 
better determine what works for deterrence and what doesn’t, giving prosecutors 
a more effective tool kit for engaging with TBTJ ﬁrms. 
Opacity also prevents the public from determining a settlement’s true costs. 
Press releases can aggregate ﬁnes, penalties, disgorgement, restitution, and cost 
ﬁgures associated with in-kind actions, such as a bank’s agreement to offer mort-
gage modiﬁcations to borrowers improperly sold predatory loans. But unless a 
settlement agreement expressly labels the payment a “ﬁne” or a “penalty,” or 
prohibits the ﬁrm from claiming a tax deduction, companies may claim some 
 
240. Letter from Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Att’y, E. Dist. N.Y., to Judge John Gleeson, U.S. Dist. 
Court, E. Dist. of N.Y. at 3, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-763 (E.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 1, 2015), ECF No. 33. 
241. See infra Appendix B, Deferred Prosecution Agreement Procedures Act § 1(h)(1)(C). 
242. See Garrett, supra note 18. 
243. Phineas Baxandall & Michelle Surka, Settling for a Lack of Accountability?: Which Federal Agen-
cies Allow Companies to Write Out-of-Court Settlements as Tax Deductions, and Which Are Trans-
parent About It, U.S. PUB. INT. RES. GROUP EDUC. FUND 13 ﬁg.1 (Dec. 2015), https://uspirg.org
/sites/pirg/ﬁles/reports/USPIRG_SettlementsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7QW 
-FC9U]. 
244. See Corporate Prosecution Registry, U. VA. L. LIBR., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett 
/corporate-prosecution-registry [https://perma.cc/4VYA-JTPD]. 
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settlement costs as deductible business expenses, shifting a ﬁscal burden onto 
the public sector and diluting the settlement’s deterrent value.
245
 Thus, the Act 
includes provisions modeled on the Truth in Settlements Act of 2017 to require 
DOJ to break out those payments that each settlement agreement expressly des-
ignates as not tax deductible.
246
 
Today, DPAs permit tacit collusion between prosecutors and TBTJ defend-
ants, but they also enable the government to respond ﬂexibly to complex corpo-
rate crimes. Procedural regularity and political accountability are overdue. The 
Act would divide supervision among the executive branch, the judiciary, and civil 
society. It is not intended to prevent settlements or force prosecutors to take cor-
porate defendants, whether individuals or ﬁrms, to trial. Rather, it seeks to en-
sure that an administration cannot generate political capital through prosecu-
tions unless it effectively addresses the root causes of corporate crime, so that 
corporate criminal prosecution is not just a form of rent extraction but an effec-
tive deterrent. 
conclusion 
This Note uses economic formalism to make an intuitive point: if an organ-
ization and its managers decide “rationally” to undertake a course of criminal 
conduct, and if they know a priori that the state is constrained in how severely it 
can punish them, then they will be underdeterred relative to the ideal. This eco-
nomic analysis recognizing the size, interconnectedness, and political power of 
some contemporary ﬁrms shows how the government’s power to deter corporate 
crime breaks down in the context of a highly concentrated political economy. 
When TBTJ ﬁrms ﬁnd that crime does pay under certain circumstances, the gov-
ernment will struggle to elicit good-faith cooperation against culpable individu-
als. But the government’s investigative strategy relies heavily on cooperation and 
self-reporting. This Note recasts the relative dearth of individual prosecutions as 
a consequence of corporate power and a government strategy made overly def-
erential in the name of efficiency. The weaknesses of this strategy help explain 
how an era of aggressive corporate criminal prosecution has coincided with suc-
cessive waves of criminality among certain large corporations. 
In response, DOJ could focus more intently on bringing individual prosecu-
tions in order to both rely less on internal investigations to generate evidence 
 
245. See generally Baxandall & Surka, supra note 243 (questioning the deterrent value of such set-
tlements and noting that, as a result of them, the public may endure higher taxes, cuts to 
funding for public programs, and increased national debt). 
246. Compare Appendix B, Deferred Prosecution Agreement Procedures Act § 1(k) (“Transpar-
ency”), with Truth in Settlements Act of 2017, S. 1145, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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and to craft more effective structural-reform mandates. But as a political strategy, 
this is limited. This methodological point is unlikely to make headway with an 
administration reluctant to prosecute white-collar crime. And for administra-
tions with a popular mandate to address the problem of corporate crime, the 
relatively quick political victories of multibillion-dollar settlements achieved 
through the usual “cooperative” means may prove too alluring to pass up. A leg-
islative reform introducing binding procedural requirements and meaningful ju-
dicial review aims for a more structural ﬁx. It would reinvigorate the separation 
of powers in the area of corporate criminal law, insulate defendants from pros-
ecutorial pressure tactics, and require prosecutors to generate evidence against 
speciﬁc individuals as a prerequisite to the political payoff of a corporate settle-
ment. Ultimately, these problems are pathological consequences of our highly 
concentrated political economy and therefore beyond prosecutors’ power to re-
solve. But so long as the government treats some corporations as TBTJ, it should 
not rely on corporate ﬁnes alone to manage their criminal conduct. 
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appendix a:  mathematical appendix 
1. Additional Derivations Under Perfect Information 
With perfect information, the manager’s contract can condition on veriﬁable 
effort. Building on (1), the risk-neutral manager’s utility is 
𝑈 ൌ 𝜔 ൅ 𝜇ሺ𝑚 ൅ 𝑛ሻ ൅ 𝐸ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝐶ሺ𝑛, 𝑚ሻ െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛ሻ𝜎ሾ𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻሿ.      (16) 
The ﬁrm faces an individual-rationality constraint on the contract, 𝑈 ൒ 𝑘, where 
k is the manager’s best outside option. The ﬁrm chooses effort levels to balance 
the private beneﬁt accruing from socially harmful activity, the disutility of effort, 
and the expected sanction when the manager is caught committing a crime. Sub-
stituting equation (16) into equation (2) and assuming that the individual-ra-
tionality constraint binds, the proﬁt function is 
𝐵 ൌ ሺ𝑚 ൅ 𝑛ሻ ൅ 𝐸ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝐶ሺ𝑛, 𝑚ሻ െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛ሻ𝜎 ቀ𝑆௙ ൅ 𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻቁ െ 𝑘.    (17) 
The ﬁrst-order conditions are 
𝐵௠ ൌ 1 െ 𝐶௠ ൌ 0      (18) 
𝐵௡ ൌ 1 ൅ 𝐸௡ െ 𝐶௡ െ 𝑃௡ሺ𝑛ሻ𝜎ൣ𝑆௙ ൅ 𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ൧ ൌ 0.  (19) 
The second-order conditions for a maximum hold because 𝐶௠௡, 𝐶௠௠, 𝐶௡௡ ൐0; 𝐸௡௡ ൏ 0; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃௡௡ ൒ 0. These conditions can be solved for optimum effort 
levels 〈𝑚∗, 𝑛∗〉 as functions of criminal law policy 〈𝜎, 𝑆௙, 𝑆௠, 𝜋〉 and the parame-
ters of the E, C, and P. 
Rearranging (3), the government’s objective function becomes 
𝑊 ൌ ሺ𝑚 ൅ 𝑛ሻ ൅ 𝐸ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝐶ሺ𝑛, 𝑚ሻ െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛ሻሾ𝐻 ൅ 𝐷ሺ𝜋ሻሿ െ 𝑘. (20) 
Following Garoupa, align the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function with the government’s so-
cial-welfare function and rearrange to ﬁnd the optimal enforcement strategy
247
: 
𝑆௙ ൅ 𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ ൌ ுା஽ሺగሻఙ .   (21) 
To fully internalize the harms created by exerting antisocial effort, the sum of the 
ﬁnes and the monetary equivalent of the expected disutility of incarceration 
should equal the sum of social harm and incarceration cost, weighted by the 
probability of conviction. Since both the ﬁrm and the manager are risk neutral, 
there are no information asymmetries, and complete contracts are possible, the 
division of the ﬁne between corporate and individual liability is irrelevant. 
 
247. Garoupa, supra note 64, at 246. 
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Following Becker’s argument that ﬁnes are socially preferable sentences to 
imprisonment because the former is a costless transfer that can compensate vic-
tims and the latter is costly, ﬁnes should be maximal before sentencing a defend-
ant to prison.
248
 That is, 
if 𝜋 ൐ 0, then 𝑆௙ ൅ 𝑆௠ ൌ 𝑊ഥ ൅ 𝜉.  (22) 
2. Derivation Under Moral Hazard 
Section III.B assumed that ﬁrms have perfect information about managerial 
effort, but few crimes are committed without concealment.
249
 Thus, this Section 
will relax this assumption and follow Garoupa by introducing an information 
asymmetry. If neither the amount nor the nature of the manager’s effort is ob-
servable within the ﬁrm, then employment contracts cannot condition on a pre-
cise output of effort and a ﬁrst-best contract is impossible. Instead, the model 
adopts agency theory to design a risk-sharing employment contract that incen-
tivizes the constrained-optimal exertion of antisocial effort. Expanding the ex-
pected punishment 𝜏ሺ𝑛; 𝜎, 𝑆௠, 𝜋ሻ in equation (1), the manager’s utility becomes 
𝑈 ൌ 𝜔 ൅ 𝜇ሺ𝑚 ൅ 𝑛ሻ ൅ 𝐸ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝐶ሺ𝑚, 𝑛ሻ െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛ሻ𝜎ሾ𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻሿ.       (23) 
Assuming the manager follows standard utility-maximizing behavior, the ﬁrst 
order conditions for his choice of effort are 
𝑈௠ ൌ 𝜇 െ 𝐶௠ ൌ 0    (24) 
𝑈௡ ൌ 𝜇 ൅ 𝐸௡ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝐶௡ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝑃௡ሺ𝑛ሻ𝜎ሾ𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻሿ.  (25) 
Together, these conditions reﬂect the incentive-compatibility constraint, deﬁning 
the agent’s effort choice to be ⟨𝑚ෝ, 𝑛ො⟩.250 Conditions (24) and (25) show that the 
manager’s rational choice of both forms of effort is increasing in his revenue 




Since the ﬁrm cannot observe the manager’s effort, the employment contract 
receives its structure by satisfying the individual-rationality constraint, 𝑈ሺ𝑚ෝ, 𝑛ොሻ ൒
𝑘, and the incentive-compatibility constraint, ⟨𝑚ෝ, 𝑛ො⟩. Applying these constraints 
 
248. See Becker, supra note 58, at 193. 
249. More generally, intraﬁrm information asymmetries are intrinsic to companies’ hierarchical 
structures of management, monitoring, and control. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 66. 
250. This incentive-compatibility constraint dictates the manager’s rational choice of continuous ef-
fort levels ⟨𝑚ෝ, 𝑛ො⟩ given the incentive structure deﬁned by the law enforcement policy. Since 
both the ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for a utility maximum hold, this choice is unique. 
This presentation of the incentive-compatibility constraint is borrowed from Garoupa. 
251. Recall that 𝐶௡, 𝐶௠, 𝐸௡ ൐ 0. 
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and combining with equation (23), the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt becomes a function 
of induced effort levels: 
𝐵 ൌ ሺ𝑚ෝ ൅ 𝑛ොሻ ൅ 𝐸ሺ𝑛ොሻ െ 𝐶ሺ𝑚ෝ, 𝑛ොሻ െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛ොሻ𝜎 ቀ𝑆௙ ൅ 𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻቁ.  (26) 
As the ﬁrm chooses the revenue-sharing parameter μ to maximize proﬁts, take 
the ﬁrst-order condition using the chain rule: 
𝐵ఓ ൌ 𝐵௠𝑚ෝఓ ൅ 𝐵௡𝑛ොఓ ൌ 0.   (27) 
Where 
𝐵௠ ൌ 1 െ 𝐶௠ሺ𝑚ෝሻ    (28) 
𝐵௡ ൌ 1 ൅ 𝐸௡ොሺ𝑛ොሻ െ  𝐶௡ሺ𝑛ොሻ െ  𝑃௡ሺ𝑛ොሻ𝜎ൣ𝑆௔ ൅ 𝑆௣ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ൧. (29) 
Combining equations (28) and (29) with equations (24) and (25), one obtains 
𝐵௠ ൌ 1 െ 𝜇     (30) 
𝐵௡ ൌ 1 െ 𝜇 െ 𝑃௡ሺ𝑛ොሻ𝜎𝑆௙.   (31) 
Aligning the ﬁrm’s incentives with social welfare by setting equation (3) equal 
to equation (26) recovers equation (4) as the joint condition for a law enforce-
ment policy that fully internalizes the costs of crime. 
In the absence of corporate liability (𝑆௙ ൌ 0), equation (24) shows that the 
optimal contract is to pay the manager his full marginal product (i.e., 𝜇 ൌ 1), 
thereby incentivizing the maximal choice of productive effort 𝑚ෝ . When all crim-
inal sanctions fall on the manager, he assumes the full risk of criminal prosecu-
tion and thus requires the full beneﬁt from wrongdoing. Equations (24) and (31) 
dictate that corporate liability reduces the manager’s revenue share and decreases 
productive effort 𝑚ෝ . This intraﬁrm incentive distortion means that optimal pol-
icy requires maximizing ﬁnes against the manager before instituting corporate 
liability. However, the optimal ﬁne will likely exceed the manager’s collectable 
wealth, represented by the individual-wealth constraint 𝑆௠ ൑ 𝑊ഥ . Since social-
welfare maximization accounts for the disutility of this incentive distortion, op-




If the TBTJ constraint 𝑆௙ ൑ 𝜉 binds, there will be underdeterrence and inef-
ﬁciently high negative externalities in the form of elevated corporate crime. To 
optimally internalize the social harm of crime when both the individual-wealth 
and TBTJ constraints bind, authorities must be willing to impose nonmonetary 
 
252. See Garoupa, supra note 64, at 247. 
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penalties on the manager. To account for the efficiency costs of intraﬁrm incen-
tive distortion, represented by 𝜁ሺ𝜇ሻ, adjust equation (6) to ﬁnd the socially op-
timal threat of incarceration
253
: 
𝜋 ൌ 𝐽ିଵ ቂுା஽ሺగሻఙ െ 𝑊ഥ െ 𝜉 െ 𝜁ሺ𝜇ሻቃ.   (32) 
3. Additional Derivations When the Firm Can Cooperate 
The manager’s ﬁrst-order conditions are 
𝑈௠ ൌ 𝜇 െ 𝐶௠ ൌ 0     (33) 
𝑈௡ ൌ 𝜇 ൅ 𝐸௡ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝐶௡ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝑃௡ሺ𝑛ሻሾ𝜌 ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎ሿሾ𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻሿ ൌ 0.  (34) 
Together equations (33) and (34) deﬁne the incentive-compatibility condition on 
the manager’s effort choice 〈𝑚෥, 𝑛෤〉. Including the costs of the internal-control 
mechanism 𝑇ሺ𝜌ሻ and corporate liability SR resulting from turning over evidence 
of employee wrongdoing, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is 
𝐵 ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝜇ሻሺ𝑚෥ ൅ 𝑛෤ሻ െ 𝜔 െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛෤ሻൣ𝜌𝑆ோ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎𝑆௙൧ െ 𝑇ሺ𝜌ሻ.      (35) 
Combining this with equation (7) and subject to the individual-rationality con-
straint ሺ𝑈 ൒ 𝑘ሻ, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt rearranges to 
𝐵 ൌ ሺ𝑚෥ ൅ 𝑛෤ሻ ൅ 𝐸ሺ𝑛෤ሻ െ 𝐶ሺ𝑚෥, 𝑛෤ሻ               
െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛෤ሻ ൥ 𝜌൫𝑆ோ ൅ 𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽
ሺ𝜋ሻ൯ ൅
ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎 ቀ𝑆௙ ൅ 𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻቁ൩ െ 𝑇
ሺ𝜌ሻ െ 𝑘.             (36) 
This proﬁt function (36) reﬂects that the ﬁrm funds a compliance department 
and reports managerial credibility with probability 𝜌. Use the chain rule to cal-
culate the ﬁrst-order conditions: 
𝐵ఓ ൌ 𝐵௡𝑛෤ఓ ൅ 𝐵௠𝑚෥ఓ ൌ 0    (37) 
𝐵ఘ ൌ 𝐵௡𝑛෤ఘ ൅ 𝐵௠𝑚෥ఘ െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛෤ሻ ൥
൫𝑆ோ ൅ 𝑆௔ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ൯ െ
𝜎 ቀ𝑆௙ ൅ 𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻቁ൩ െ 𝑇ఘ ൌ 0 .      (38) 
 
Where 
𝐵௡ ൌ 1 ൅ 𝐸௡ሺ𝑛෤ሻ െ 𝐶௡ሺ𝑚෥, 𝑛෤ሻ െ 𝑃௡ሺ𝑛෤ሻ ൥
𝜌൫𝑆ோ ൅ 𝑆௔ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ൯ ൅
ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎 ቀ𝑆௙ ൅ 𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻቁ൩   (39) 
 
253. Efficiency costs are zero when the manager’s revenue share is unity, and they increase as the 
ﬁrm retains more of the proceeds from the manager’s output [i.e., 𝜁ሺ𝜇 ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 0; 𝜁ఓሺ𝜇 ∈ሾ0,1ሿ ሻ ൏ 0]. 
prosecuting corporate crime when firms are too big to jail 
1433 
𝐵௠ ൌ 1 െ 𝐶௠ ൌ 0.    (40) 
Combining with equations (33) and (34) then rearranging, these conditions be-
come 
𝐵௡ ൌ 1 െ 𝜇 െ 𝑃௡ሺ𝑛෤ሻൣ𝜌𝑆ோ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎𝑆௙൧   (41) 
𝐵௠ ൌ 1 െ 𝜇 ൌ 0.    (42) 
This deﬁnes the ﬁrm’s optimal contract set ⟨𝜇෤, 𝜌෤⟩, conditional on law enforce-
ment policy. 
As before, align the ﬁrm’s objective with the social-welfare function: 
𝑊 ൌ ሺ𝑚 ൅ 𝑛ሻ ൅ 𝐸ሺ𝑛ሻ െ 𝐶ሺ𝑚, 𝑛ሻ െ 𝑃ሺ𝑛ሻሾ𝐻 ൅ 𝐷ሺ𝜋ሻሿ െ 𝑇ሺ𝜌ሻ െ 𝑘.   (43) 
Setting equations (43) and (36) equal and accounting for the costs of intraﬁrm 
incentive distortion ζ recovers a condition for the optimal sanctions regime 
𝐻 ൅ 𝐷ሺ𝜋ሻ ൌ 𝜌𝑆ோ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎𝑆௙ ൅ ሾ𝜌 ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎ሿ൫𝑆௠ ൅ 𝐽ሺ𝜋ሻ൯ ൅ 𝜁ሺ𝜇ሻ. (44) 
If the risk-adjusted social harm is large enough that the individual-wealth con-
straint binds and individuals escape liability (π ൌ ͞), then crime will be under-
deterred without corporate liability. Imposing optimal corporate liability re-
quires sanctions to satisfy 
𝜌𝑆ோ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎𝑆௙ ൌ 𝐻 െ ሾ𝜌 ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎ሿ𝑊ഥ െ 𝜁ሺ𝜇ሻ.  (45) 
However, if social harm H is sufficiently large or the probabilities of conviction 
sufficiently small and the case involves a TBTJ ﬁrm, the TBTJ constraint will 
bind, such that 𝑆ோ ൌ 𝑆௙ ൌ 𝜉. If 𝜋 ൌ 0, then the TBTJ constraint binds when so-
cial harm is large enough that 
𝐻 ൒ ሾ𝜌 ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜌ሻ𝜎ሿሺ𝜉 ൅ 𝑊ഥ ሻ െ 𝜁ሺ𝜇ሻ.  (46) 
As discussed above, if the TBTJ constraint binds, ﬁnancial crime will be under-
deterred unless the manager expects to face incarceration: 
𝜋 ൌ 𝐽ିଵ ቂ ுା஽ሺగሻఘାሺଵିఘሻఙ െ 𝑊ഥ െ 𝜉 െ 𝜁ሺ𝜇ሻቃ.   (47) 
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appendix b:  deferred prosecution agreement procedures 
act 
§ 1—Procedures for Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
(a) The procedures in this section shall apply to any written agreement that is 
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 1361(h)(2), that is between the United States 
and a defendant business organization, and that excludes any period of delay 
from the time limitations speciﬁed in the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1361, 
during which the attorney for the government defers prosecution for the 
purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate its good conduct. 
(b) Deﬁnitions—For the purposes of this section, the following deﬁnitions ap-
ply: 
(1) “Defendant” refers to an organization, as deﬁned by 18 U.S.C. § 18 as “a 
person other than an individual”—including corporations, partnerships, 
associations, joint-stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, un-
incorporated organizations, governments and political subdivisions 
thereof, and nonproﬁt organizations
254
—that has been charged with any 
offense in an indictment or criminal information ﬁled in any federal dis-
trict court; 
(2) “Deferred Prosecution Agreement,” “Agreement,” or “DPA” refer to any 
proposed agreement reached between the United States and a Defend-
ant that would exclude any period of delay from the time limitations 
speciﬁed in 18 U.S.C. § 1361, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1361(h)(2); 
(3) “Financial Penalties” refers to any ﬁne, disgorgement of unlawful pro-
ceeds, or any other ﬁnancial payment made by a Defendant to the United 
States pursuant to a DPA; 
(4) “Structural-Reform Mandate” refers to any provision of an Agreement 
that requires a Defendant to undertake any action, other than payment 
of Financial Penalties; 
(5) “Monitor” refers to an attorney charged with overseeing the implemen-
tation of any Structural-Reform Mandate and ﬁling reports on the pro-
gress of that implementation with the court and with the United States. 
(c) The Attorney General shall issue regulations specifying the factors to be con-
sidered in entering into DPA negotiations with a Defendant, entering into a 
DPA, determining the adequacy of any Financial Penalties or Structural-Re-
form Mandate, and determining whether a Defendant has breached the 
terms of an applicable Agreement. 
 
254. Cf. Guidelines Manual, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION § 8A1.1 (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.ussc
.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4J6 
-JJFH]. 
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(d) Form of Agreement—Any joint motion for the court’s approval of the pro-
posed Agreement under 18 U.S.C. § 1361(h)(2) shall include: 
(1) An indictment or criminal information stating the theory of criminal li-
ability; 
(2) A statement of facts; 
(3) A written Agreement, stating its terms in their entirety, including the 
term of the Agreement during which prosecution will be deferred and 
any Financial Penalties, Structural-Reform Mandate, restitution made 
to victims of the Defendant’s crime, or protocol to govern a Monitor’s 
supervisory authority and reporting obligations; and 
(4) A statement from the attorney for the government explaining why the 
Agreement’s terms are a sufficient punishment for the Defendant’s 
crime, how the agreement will promote the Defendant’s reform or pre-
vent future unlawful conduct, and how the decision to defer prosecution 
and enter the Agreement serves the public interest. 
(e) Judicial Approval—Before approving any Agreement or exclusion of time 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1361(h)(2), the court shall independently deter-
mine: 
(1) that the indictment or information states a sufficient theory of criminal 
liability and that the statement of facts contains sufficient detail to sup-
port the theory of liability; and 
(2) that the approval of the Agreement serves the public interest. 
(f) Procedure for Judicial Approval— 
(1) In making its determination under subsection (2), the court may: 
(A) take testimony of government officials, witnesses, or experts, upon 
the motion of any party or participant or upon its own motion, as 
the court may deem appropriate; 
(B) obtain the views of any individual, group or agency of government 
with respect to any aspects of the proposed Agreement, in such a 
manner as the court deems appropriate; 
(C) appoint an independent attorney as amicus curiae to brief the court 
on any aspect of the proposed Agreement or its effects; 
(D) consider any letters or other submissions from victims, government 
officials, or any interested party; and 
(E) take such other action in the public interest as the court may deem 
appropriate. 
(2) Upon motion of the Defendant, or upon its own motion, the court may 
require the government to offer evidence sufficient to reasonably infer 
any fact in the statement of facts or any legal conclusion in the indict-
ment or information. The evidence offered by the government need not 
be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the court may, 
for good cause, permit the evidence to be ﬁled under seal. No Agreement 
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may include a provision in which a Defendant forfeits its right to make 
a motion under this subsection. 
(g) Effect of Agreement— 
(1) Proceedings before the district court under subsection (f)(1) and state-
ments prepared by the government under subsection (d)(4) shall not be 
admissible against any Defendant in any action or proceeding brought 
by a private party against such Defendant. 
(2) A Defendant may interpose the Agreement as a complete defense to any 
criminal action brought by the federal government arising from the 
same conduct as that covered in the Agreement. 
(h) Conduct of Monitors— 
(1) If the Agreement includes provisions for the appointment of a Monitor: 
(A) The court must approve the monitor’s appointment. 
(B) The Monitor’s reports shall be ﬁled with the court. 
(C) The Monitor’s reports shall be deemed judicial documents, and re-
dacted or summary versions shall be publicly accessible unless the 
statement prepared pursuant to subsection (d)(4) provides good 
cause for permitting the reports to be ﬁled under seal. If any reports 
or summaries are to be publicly disclosed, the court shall permit the 
parties to propose redactions of conﬁdential business information 
or summaries. 
(D) At any time while the Agreement is in effect, the parties may petition 
the court to object to the Monitor’s conduct, and the court may di-
rect the Monitor to act as it deems appropriate. 
(2) The Attorney General shall issue regulations governing the selection, su-
pervision, and conduct of Monitors. 
(i) Administration— 
(1) The Attorney General shall establish an Office of Corporate Reform 
(“the Office”) in the Department of Justice. 
(2) Attorneys for the government negotiating an Agreement with a Defend-
ant shall coordinate with the Office regarding the speciﬁcation of any 
Structural-Reform Mandates or Monitor protocols. 
(3) The Office shall be responsible for overseeing pending DPAs to verify 
that Defendants comply with their terms. 
(4) In discharging its responsibilities under this subsection, the Office shall 
work cooperatively with any appropriate state, federal, or private regu-
lators. 
(j) Terminating the Agreement— 
(1) At the end of the Agreement’s speciﬁed term, the court shall dismiss the 
pending charges unless the United States provides good cause to ﬁnd 
that the Defendant has violated its obligations under the Agreement, in 
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which case the court may maintain the pending charges on its docket 
and extend the Agreement for a period up to one year. 
(2) At any time while the Agreement is in effect and on a motion for good 
cause, the court may permit the United States to terminate the Agree-
ment and resume prosecution if the court ﬁnds that the Defendant has 
materially breached the Agreement. The Defendant may oppose termi-
nation and call witnesses in its defense. 
(k) Transparency— 
(1) The Attorney General shall, subject to the exceptions permitted by sub-
section (k)(3), make publicly available all Agreements that have been 
approved under paragraph (e) of this section or submitted for such ap-
proval. These Agreements shall be posted in a searchable format and on 
a prominent place on the Department of Justice’s website. For each 
posted Agreement, the listing shall include: 
(A) all documents listed in paragraph (d) of this section that were ﬁled 
with the court when approval was sought; 
(B) the date on which the parties entered into the settlement; 
(C) the date on which the settlement shall terminate subject to subsec-
tion (j)(1); 
(D) the names of the Defendants that settled claims under the Agree-
ment; 
(E) the names of any natural persons prosecuted in connection with the 
conduct covered under the Agreement and the outcomes of those 
prosecutions; 
(F) the identity of any appointed Monitor; 
(G) any public statement required under subsection (3); and 
(H) for each Defendant— 
1. the total Financial Penalties to be paid under the Agreement; 
2. the amount, if any, that is expressly designated as criminal or 
civil penalties or ﬁnes; 
3. the amount, if any, to be paid in restitution to victims of the De-
fendant’s crime; 
4. the amount, if any, expressly speciﬁed under the Agreement as 
not tax-deductible; 
5. any actions the Defendant is taking in lieu of a payment to a 
federal, state, or local government entity; 
6. any actions the Defendant has already taken that are credited in 
the Agreement as being in lieu of a payment to a federal, state, 
or local government entity. 
(2) The Attorney General shall maintain the public accessibility of material 
required to be posted under subsection (1) for no fewer than ﬁve years 
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after the date on which the settlement shall terminate subject to subsec-
tion (j)(1). 
(3) The requirement to disclose any piece of information listed under sub-
section (1) shall not apply if the Attorney General determines that main-
taining the conﬁdentiality of that information is necessary to protect the 
public interest of the United States. If any information is kept conﬁden-
tial under this authority, the Attorney General shall issue a public state-
ment explaining why such action is necessary to protect the public in-
terest of the United States. This statement shall explain: 
(A) what interests conﬁdentiality protects; and 
(B) why the interests protected by conﬁdentiality outweigh the public’s 
interest in knowing about the conduct of the federal government 
and the expenditure of federal resources. 
§ 2—Prohibition of Nonprosecution Agreements 
(a) It shall be unlawful for the government to enter into any agreement with a 
business organization in which the government agrees to decline prosecu-
tion in exchange for payment of a ﬁne, penalty, or other monetary consider-
ation. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing the govern-
ment from issuing advisory opinions, issuing no-action letters, entering into 
immunity agreements, entering into civil consent decrees ﬁled in a court, or 
entering plea bargaining agreements governed by Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11. 
(b) The government may enter an agreement with a business organization to 
defer prosecution in exchange for consideration, pursuant to its authority 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1361(h)(2) and subject to the requirements of § 1 of this 
Act, provided any such agreement is approved by a district court with juris-
diction. 
(c) Any agreement that violates this section shall be void and unenforceable as 
a matter of public policy. 
 
 
